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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
13-1339
Ruling Below: Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. Cal. 2014)
The Circuit panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, based on Article III standing, of an
action alleging willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
The panel held that the individual plaintiff had Article III standing to sue a website’s operator
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for publishing inaccurate personal information about
himself. The panel also held that law of the case did not limit the district court in its final order,
and it was free to reconsider its own prior ruling on standing , where the district court had neither
been divested of jurisdiction nor submitted this case to the jury.
Question Presented: Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who
suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal
statute.

Thomas ROBINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situation
Plaintiffs
v.
SPOKEO, INC., a California corporation
Defendants
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided on February 4, 2014
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether an individual has
Article III standing to sue a website’s
operator under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
for
publishing
inaccurate
personal
information about himself.
I

Spokeo, Inc. operates a website that provides
users with information about other
individuals, including contact data, marital
status, age, occupation, economic health, and
wealth level. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo
for willful violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), related to its website.
Although he asserted that Spokeo’s website
contained false information about him,
Robins’s allegations of injury were sparse.
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Spokeo moved to dismiss Robins’s original
complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on the ground that Robins lacked
standing sufficient under Article III of the
United States Constitution.
On January 27, 2011, the district court ruled
that Robins had failed to allege an injury in
fact because he had not alleged “any actual or
imminent harm.” The court characterized
Robins’s allegations as simply “that he has
been unsuccessful in seeking employment,
and that he is concerned that the inaccuracies
in his report will affect his ability to obtain
credit, employment, insurance, and the like.”
The district court noted that “[a]llegations of
possible future injury do not satisfy the
[standing] requirements of Art. III” and
dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Robins thereafter filed his First Amended
Complaint (FAC). Similar to the original
complaint, the FAC alleged willful violations
of the FCRA. For example, the website
allegedly described Robins as holding a
graduate degree and as wealthy, both of
which are alleged to be untrue. Robins, who
is unemployed, described the misinformation
as “caus[ing] actual harm to [his]
employment
prospects.”
Remaining
unemployed has cost Robins money as well
as caused “anxiety, stress, concern, and/or
worry about his diminished employment
prospects.”
Again, Spokeo moved to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that
Robins lacked standing under Article III. On
May 11, the district court denied the
motion and concluded that Robins had
alleged a sufficient injury in fact, namely

Spokeo’s “marketing of inaccurate consumer
reporting information about” Robins. The
court also ruled that the injury was traceable
to Spokeo’s alleged violations of the FCRA
and that the injury was redressable through a
favorable court decision.
On September 19, after Spokeo moved to
certify an interlocutory appeal, the district
court reconsidered its previous ruling on
standing. It then ruled, contrary to its May
11 order, that Robins failed to plead an injury
in fact and that any injuries pled were not
traceable to Spokeo’s alleged violations,
dismissing the action. Robins timely
appealed.
II
On appeal, Robins first argues that the lawof-the-case doctrine prohibited the district
court from revisiting its own May 11
decision. In United States v. Smith, however,
we held that the law-of-the-case doctrine
does not apply “to circumstances where a
district court seeks to reconsider an order
over which it has not been divested of
jurisdiction.” In this case, the district court
was not divested of jurisdiction prior to its
September 19 order.
Although United States v. Alexander held
that the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded a
district court from reconsidering an
evidentiary issue after a mistrial, we
distinguished Alexander in Smith and do so
again here. The rule from Alexander applies
only to cases in which a submission to the
jury separates the two decisions.
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Here, because the district court had neither
been divested of jurisdiction nor submitted
this case to the jury, it was free to reconsider
its own prior ruling. The law-of-the-case
doctrine did not limit the district court.
III
Robins next argues that the FAC sufficiently
alleges Article III standing and that the May
11 ruling was correct. The FAC indeed
alleges violations of various statutory
provisions. Robins contends that because
these provisions are enforceable through a
private cause of action, they create statutory
rights that he has standing to vindicate in
court.
The district court properly recognized that it
would not have subject-matter jurisdiction if
Robins did not have standing. The district
court also correctly identified the three
components of standing: (1) the plaintiff “has
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical”;
(2) “the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant”; and (3)
“it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Although more may be
required at later stages of the litigation, on a
motion to dismiss, “general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant’s conduct may suffice.”
A
In standing cases that analyze statutory
rights, our precedent establishes two

propositions. First, Congress’s creation of a
private cause of action to enforce a statutory
provision implies that Congress intended the
enforceable provision to create a statutory
right. Second, the violation of a statutory
right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to
confer standing.
Spokeo contends, however, that Robins
cannot sue under the FCRA without showing
actual harm. But the statutory cause of action
does not require a showing of actual harm
when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.
The scope of the cause of action determines
the scope of the implied statutory right.
When, as here, the statutory cause of action
does not require proof of actual damages, a
plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory
right without suffering actual damages.
B
Of course, the Constitution limits the power
of Congress to confer standing. This
constitutional limit, however, does not
prohibit Congress from “elevating to the
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete,
de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.”
The issue before us is whether violations of
statutory rights created by the FCRA are
“concrete, de facto injuries” that Congress
can so elevate. We are not the first Court of
Appeals to face this question. In Beaudry, the
Sixth Circuit considered whether an FCRA
plaintiff suing under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n had
sufficiently alleged an injury in fact by
alleging a violation of the FCRA. The court
identified two constitutional limitations on
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congressional power to confer standing. First,
a plaintiff “must be ‘among
the injured,’ in the sense that she alleges the
defendants violated her statutory rights.”
Second, the statutory right at issue must
protect against “individual, rather than
collective, harm.” The Beaudry court held
that the plaintiff satisfied both of these
requirements.
Robins is in the same position. First, he
alleges that Spokeo violated his statutory
rights, not just the statutory rights of other
people, so he is “among the injured.” Second,
the interests protected by the statutory rights
at issue are sufficiently concrete and
particularized that Congress can elevate
them. Like “an individual’s personal interest
in living in a racially integrated community”
or “a company’s interest in marketing its
product free from competition,” Robins’s
personal interests in the handling of his credit
information are individualized rather than
collective. Therefore, alleged violations of
Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to
satisfy the injury-infact requirement of
Article III.

In addition to injury in fact, of course,
standing
requires
causation
and
redressability. Where statutory rights are
asserted, however, our cases have described
the standing inquiry as boiling down to
“essentially” the injury-in-fact prong. When
the injury in fact is the violation of a statutory
right that we inferred from the existence of a
private cause of action, causation and
redressability will usually be satisfied. First,
there is little doubt that a defendant’s alleged
violation of a statutory provision “caused”
the violation of a right created by that
provision. Second, statutes like the FCRA
frequently provide for monetary damages,
which redress the violation of statutory
rights. Therefore, Robins has adequately pled
causation and redressability in this case.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, Robins adequately
alleges Article III standing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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“9th Circuit Revives FCRA Suit Against Spokeo Site”
Law360
Kurt Orzeck
February 4, 2014
The Ninth Circuit on Tuesday revived a
putative class action accusing “people search
engine” Spokeo.com of willfully violating
the Fair Credit Reporting Act by publishing
false information about a Virginia man,
saying he had constitutional standing to bring
the complaint.
Reversing a California federal judge's
dismissal of Thomas Robins' suit against
Pasadena-based Spokeo Inc., which compiles
information from various online and offline
sources into reports and sells them to
subscribers, the appeals court said the alleged
violations of his statutory rights sufficiently
satisfied
Article
III's
injury-in-fact
requirement.
Robins claimed he had suffered an actionable
injury because the site provided prospective
employers
with
inaccurate
personal
information about him and didn't exercise its
responsibilities as a consumer reporting
agency with fairness. He seeks to represent a
class of individuals in a similar situation.
Spokeo attorneys countered that there was no
allegation that “something scandalous” was
spread about Robins or that he actually lost
employment as a result of the allegedly
inaccurate information.
The Ninth Circuit ruled Tuesday that a
showing of actual harm isn't needed when a
plaintiff sues for willful FCRA violations.

“The scope of the cause of action determines
the scope of the implied statutory right.
When, as here, the statutory cause of action
does not require proof of actual damages, a
plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory
right without suffering actual damage,” the
court said.
Robins filed suit in July 2010, alleging that a
significant portion of the consumer report
Spokeo had compiled about him was
incorrect, including his employment status,
marital status, age, educational background,
number of children, “economic health” and
“wealth level.” The profile also contained a
picture of someone else, he claimed.
Spokeo violated the FCRA by failing to take
reasonable steps to ensure that the
information was accurate, according to the
suit.
A California federal judge granted Spokeo's
motion to dismiss in January 2011, citing
lack of standing. He ruled that Robins had
“failed to allege that defendant caused him
any actual or imminent harm” and his
allegations of possible future injury did not
satisfy standing requirements.
Robins argued to the Ninth Circuit in
November that U.S. District Judge Otis D.
Wright II erred in finding that he hadn't
alleged an injury-in-fact.
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The three-judge panel agreed, saying Robins’
personal interests in the handling of his credit
information were individualized rather than
collective, thus he had standing under Article
III.
The Tuesday opinion also noted that Robins
had adequately pled causation and
redressability, which are also required for
standing. The defendant’s alleged violation
of a FCRA statutory provision caused the
violation of a right created by that provision,
and the FCRA provides for monetary
damages that redress statutory-right
violations, according to the appeals court
said.

Steven Woodrow of Edelson PC, which is
representing Robins, told Law360 on
Tuesday that the Ninth Circuit decision is a
victory for consumer rights.
“The FCRA was passed because [the U.S.]
Congress recognized that recklessly
spreading false information about people to
their potential creditors and employers is
harmful in its own right and that consumers
shouldn't have to prove the actual damages
they've suffered,” he said. “The opinion
recognizes the same thing and gives
thousands of job and credit seekers who've
had false information reported about them
their day in court.”
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“SCOTUS to Decide if ‘Unharmed’ Plaintiffs Have Right to Sue”
Reuters
Alison Frankel
April 27, 2015
Just about a year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided not to hear a case involving a class
action against a couple of Midwestern banks
that didn’t post both of the required notices
on its ATM machines. The banks’ petition for
certiorari raised the same question that had
piqued the Supreme Court’s interest in the
2011 case First American Financial v.
Edwards: Can Congress confer constitutional
standing on otherwise uninjured consumers
by giving them a private right of action? But
the justices mysteriously dismissed First
American on the last day of their term in 2012
and were unwilling to revisit the tough
question of Congress and consumers’ right to
sue in the ATM case, prompting me to ask in
a column if the Supreme Court had lost its
zeal to curb consumer class actions.
That may have been premature. On Monday,
the justices granted the search site Spokeo’s
petition for certiorari in Spokeo v. Robins, a
case in which the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the certification of a class of
consumers who claimed Spokeo owes them
statutory damages for violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. Spokeo’s counsel of
record, Andrew Pincus of Mayer Brown,
framed the question presented as broadly as
it was in Edwards and the ATM case:
“Whether Congress may confer Article III
standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no
concrete harm, and who therefore could not
otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court, by authorizing a private right of action

based on a bare violation of a federal
statute?”
As Mayer Brown emphasized in its petition –
and as amici including eBay, Facebook and
Google underscored – the Supreme Court’s
answer to that question will impact not just
class actions brought under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act but also cases citing the
Telephone Consumers Protection Act, the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the Truth in
Lending Act and a half-dozen other federal
laws authorizing consumers to sue for
statutory damages. Big businesses have been
complaining for years that these laws give
plaintiffs and their lawyers an unfair
advantage because they can assert statutory
damages claims for hundreds of millions of
dollars on behalf of thousands of consumers
who suffered no concrete harm.
If the Supreme Court sides with Spokeo and
holds that otherwise uninjured plaintiffs can’t
sue for money damages based on statutory
violations, big businesses will have another
reason to fete Pincus, whose 2011 high court
win in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion upheld
the validity of mandatory arbitration clauses
with class action waivers. “This is an
important issue that the court should address
and now it will,” Pincus told me.
Pincus’ opponent in the Spokeo case is
Deepak Gupta of Gupta Beck – who also
represented class members in the Concepcion
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case. In his brief opposing certiorari, Gupta
argued both that the Supreme Court need not
answer the abstract question Spokeo posed
and that the named plaintiff in the class action
against the search site had suffered actual
harm when Spokeo published inaccurate
personal information about him. (Among
other things, the site said he was married
when he was not.) Gupta was traveling and
unavailable for comment but previously told
me the distinction between injury-in-fact and
injury-in-the-law
is
“philosophically
incoherent.”
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
overruled the suggestion of the U.S. solicitor
general, who argued against review of the
case in a brief the justices solicited. The

Justice Department – which had previously
urged the Supreme Court not to take the 2011
Edwards case that the court ended up
dismissing – walked back in the Spokeo brief
from its argument that Congress has a broad
right to a private right to sue. Instead, the
SG’s brief claimed that lawmakers can
elevate rights grounded in common law to
statutory causes of action. “De facto injuries
that were previously inadequate in law” can
be transformed by Congress into “legally
cognizable injuries,” according to the brief,
when the law merely codifies longstanding
principles of harm.
I’m expecting to see a lot of amicus firepower
on both sides of the Spokeo case. The future
of consumer class actions is at stake.
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“Supreme Court Weighs Right to Sue in Spokeo Case”
The Wall Street Journal
Jacob Gershman
April 27, 2015
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
hear a case that could potentially make it
easier for plaintiffs to bring class-action
lawsuits against Internet companies for
allegedly violating consumer data and
privacy laws.

also argue that Mr. Robins doesn’t have the
right to get a court to hear his case because he
hasn’t suffered a concrete harm — a
constitutional bar that plaintiffs must meet —
but merely alleges “speculative anxiety and
concern about what might happen.”

The dispute involves a lawsuit against
people-search site Spokeo Inc. over
information it posted about an unemployed
Virginia man. The plaintiff, Thomas Robins,
says Spokeo got wrong details about his age,
wealth, employment status and education
level, portraying him as more educated and
wealthier than he really was.

It’s that second argument that has piqued the
high court’s interest.

Those alleged errors, he claims, hurt his
employment prospects, causing him
“economic, reputational, and emotional”
injuries. A trial court dismissed his case, a
decision that the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed last year, ultimately
landing the case in the country’s top court.
The lawsuit, which is seeking class action
status, alleges violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, a federal law that regulates
credits bureaus and sets standards over how
consumer credit information is collected,
stored and shared.
Lawyers for Spokeo deny the violations,
arguing that they’re not a consumer reporting
agency, but an Internet search engine, and
thus fall outside the scope of the law. But they

Mr. Robins says his injuries are more than
speculative. His lawyers say he has “clearly
alleged concrete and particularized injuries:
economic harm to his employment
prospects.” But they go further, arguing that
the alleged statutory violations themselves
are a sufficient basis to get a day in court.
Deepak Gupta, an attorney for Mr. Robins,
didn’t immediately have a comment on
Monday. Mr. Robins is also represented by
Edelson PC, a law firm founded by Jay
Edelson, a class-action attorney who has
made a career taking tech companies to court.
A ruling in favor of Mr. Robins could have
huge implications for large Internet
companies that have millions of users by
carving out a more elastic right to sue and
giving Congress more power to define the
judiciary’s role in settling disputes.
While the specific lawsuit concerns Spokeo,
tech companies like Google, Facebook and
Yahoo are keeping a close eye on the case. A
123

single violation of the federal consumer law
can go up to $1,000, which could translate
into a much bigger figure in a class action.
Spokeo, in a statement, said it’s pleased that
the high court “decided to consider this

important constitutional issue raised by our
petition: whether the Constitution permits
class actions seeking millions or billions of
dollars even though class members have not
suffered any injury.”
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“No Injury? No Problem”
The National Law Review
Paul Scrudato, Brittany Robbins & Thomas Crispi
May 31, 2015
The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in Spokeo v. Robins, a case that has
the potential to redefine standing in federal
court. The Ninth Circuit’s February 2014
decision permitted plaintiff Thomas Robins
to establish standing under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) with nothing more
than a speculative injury. This contravenes
Supreme Court precedent, which finds
standing when a plaintiff suffers a harm that
is actual, distinct, palpable, and concrete;
attenuated and hypothetical injuries do not
constitute an injury-in-fact. The implications
of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Spokeo v.
Robins has grabbed the attention of
companies in nearly every industry. Their
concern, as expressed by the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce – granting standing to plaintiffs
who have not suffered an injury-in-fact will
open the flood gates to no-injury class actions
brought under statutes that authorize a private
right of action. But, in truth, the implications
to businesses could extend beyond this.
Robins initiated a putative class action
against Spokeo for violating the FCRA.
Spokeo aggregates data from phone books,
social networks, marketing surveys, real
estate listings, business websites, and other
sources into an online database. The FCRA
regulates consumer information – including
consumer credit information – that is
collected, disseminated, and used in
consumer reports. Spokeo allegedly posted
false information about Robins’ wealth,

education, and marital status. Robins claims
that these misrepresentations will negatively
affect his credit, insurance and employment
prospects. While the Ninth Circuit found that
Robins had not suffered actual damages, it
ultimately held that the statutory FCRA
violation satisfied Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement. The Supreme Court has granted
cert to determine “[w]hether Congress can
create Article III standing by authorizing a
remedy for a bare statutory violation.”
The FCRA engenders dozens of federal class
actions each year. That number has jumped
since the Ninth Circuit’s decision — 29
FCRA class actions were filed in the first four
months of 2014. Many federal statutes
authorize a private right of action. For
example, internet firms interact with millions
of individuals and are subject to numerous
federal statutes with private rights of action.
Facebook, eBay, Google, and Yahoo!
expressed concern in their amicus brief that,
under the Ninth Circuit’s holding, if any of
these users was “willing (or enticed by a
plaintiff’s attorney) to allege that a
generalized practice or act violated a law
providing a private cause of action and
statutory damages, then she could launch a
putative class action on behalf of herself and
millions of other ‘similarly situated’ users . .
. [and] pursue a multi-billion dollar statutory
damages claim despite the lack of injury . . .
.”
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What do no-injury class actions mean for
manufacturers? It could mean lawsuits based
on “defective products” that allegedly violate
a state or federal statute but have not caused
any harm. For example, the food and
beverage and cosmetic industries are often
accused of misleading consumers through
false advertising, labeling, and packaging.
ConAgra was sued under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act and state consumer
protection laws for advertising its cooking
oils, which were made from GMOs, were
100% natural. And Maybelline was sued

under state consumer fraud and consumer
protection acts because its “Super Stay”
lipstick allegedly didn’t stay on the
advertised 10-14 hours. Under Robins,
plaintiffs in these no-injury, statutory-based
class actions would not need to establish that
they were physically injured to survive a
standing challenge. Will creative plaintiff
lawyers be able to craft an argument that
extends the no-injury standing rule in Robins
to non-statutory violations?
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits permit
statutory violations to confer standing
whereas the Second, Fourth, and Federal
Circuits require plaintiffs to prove an injuryin-fact. Tune in for oral arguments this Fall.
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association
14-840
Ruling Below: FERC v. Electric Power Supply, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
Electric Power Supply Association and four other energy industry associations (“Petitioners”)
petition the court for review of a final rule by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC” or “the Commission”) governing what FERC calls “demand response resources in the
wholesale energy market.” The rule seeks to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity
consumption when economically efficient. Petitioners complain FERC’s new rule goes too far,
encroaching on the states’ exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the retail market. The U.S. Court of
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, ruled in favor of Petitioners, stating that FERC had overextended its
reach, pursuant to 16 U.S.C.S. § 824(b)(1).
Question Presented: Whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reasonably
concluded that it has authority under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq., to regulate
the rules used by operators of wholesale--electricity markets to pay for reductions in electricity
consumption and to recoup those payments through adjustments to wholesale rates.

ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION
Petitioner
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Respondent
The United States Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on May 23, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
BROWN. Circuit Judge:
Under the Federal Power Act (“FPA” or “the
Act”) the Commission is generally charged
with regulating the transmission and sale of
electric power in interstate commerce. The
FPA “split[s] [jurisdiction over the sale and
delivery of electricity] between the federal
government and the states on the basis of the
type of service being provided and the nature
of the energy sale.” Section 201 of the Act

empowers FERC to regulate “the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce.” Thus, “FERC’s jurisdiction over
the sale of electricity has been specifically
confined to the wholesale market.”
The Commission concedes that “demand
response is a complex matter that lies at the
confluence of state and federal jurisdiction.”
[Order 745]. For more than a decade, FERC
has permitted demand-side resources to
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participate in organized wholesale markets,
allowing Independent System Operators
(ISOs)
and
Regional
Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) to use demand-side
resources to meet their systems’ needs for
wholesale energy, capacity, and ancillary
services. As this court has noted, Congress in
2005 declared “the policy of the United
States that time-based pricing and other
forms of demand response . . . shall be
encouraged . . . and unnecessary barriers to
demand response participation in energy,
capacity and ancillary service markets shall
be eliminated.” The Commission has issued
dozens of orders on demand-side resource
participation, and ISOs and RTOs
maintaining economic demand response
programs could file tariffs with the
Commission and accept bids for ancillary
services and from aggregators of retail
customers directly into the wholesale energy
markets.
Order 745 establishes uniform compensation
levels for suppliers of demand response
resources who participate in the “day-ahead
and real-time energy markets.” The order
directs ISOs and RTOs to pay those
suppliers, including aggregators of retail
customers, the full locational marginal price
(LMP), or the marginal value of resources in
each market typically used to compensate
generators. The Commission conditioned the
payment of full LMP on the ability of a
demand response resource to replace a
generation resource and required demand
response to be cost effective. Cost
effectiveness would be determined by a
newly devised “net benefits test,” which
FERC directed ISOs and RTOs to implement.
FERC acknowledged that the cost of

payments to retail customers to encourage
reduced energy consumption would have to
be subsidized by load-serving entities
participating in the wholesale market.
Finally, the rule allocated the costs of
demand response payments proportionally to
all entities that purchase from the relevant
energy markets during times when demand
response resources enter the market.
Commissioner Moeller dissented, arguing the
Commission’s retail customer compensation
scheme conflicted both with FERC’s efforts
to promote competitive markets and with its
statutory mandate to ensure supplies of
electric energy at just, reasonable, and not
unduly preferential or discriminatory rates.
Requests for rehearing and clarification were
filed by ISOs, RTOs, state regulatory
commissions, trade associations, publicly
owned utilities, transmission owners,
suppliers, and others. The Commission, in
another 2–1 decision, confirmed its approach
and Petitioners filed timely petitions for
review.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
directs us to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action . . . in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”
“FERC is a creature of statute” and thus “has
no power to act unless and until Congress
confers power upon it.” If FERC lacks
authority under the Federal Power Act to
promulgate a rule, its action is “plainly
contrary to law and cannot stand.”
We address FERC’s assertion of its statutory
authority under the familiar Chevron
doctrine. The question is “whether the
statutory text forecloses the agency’s
assertion of authority.” If, however, the
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statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific
issue, we must defer to the agency’s
reasonable construction of the statute.
FERC claims when retail consumers
voluntarily participate in the wholesale
market, they fall within the Commission’s
exclusive jurisdiction to make rules for that
market. Petitioners protest that retail sales of
electricity are within the traditional and
“exclusive jurisdiction of the States” and
regulating consumption by retail electricity
customers is a regulation of retail, not
wholesale, activity. The problem, Petitioners
say, is the Commission has no authority to
draw retail customers into the wholesale
markets by paying them not to make retail
purchases.
Initially, we note the regulations have a
single definition of “demand response”—a
“reduction in the consumption of electric
energy by customers from their expected
consumption in response to an increase in the
price of electric energy or to incentive
payments designed to induce lower
consumption of electric energy.” High retail
rates will reduce demand. Conversely, if
consumers are paid to reduce demand, prices
fall. FERC acknowledges the first case,
“price-responsive demand” is a “retail-level”
demand response.” In contrast, FERC dubs a
reduction in the consumption of energy in
response to incentive payments a “wholesale
demand response.” The Commission draws
this distinction between “wholesale demand
response” and “retail demand response” in an
attempt to narrow the logical reach of its rule.
Demand response resources do not actually
sell into the market. Demand response does

not involve a sale, and the resources
“participate” only by declining to act.
As noted, and as the Commission concedes,
demand response is not a wholesale sale of
electricity; in fact, it is not a sale at all. Thus,
FERC astutely does not rely exclusively on
its wholesale jurisdiction under § 201(b)(1)
for authority.
Instead, FERC argues §§ 205 and 206 grant
the agency authority over demand response
resources in the wholesale market. These
provisions task FERC with ensuring “all
rules and regulations affecting . . . rates” in
connection with the wholesale sale of electric
energy are “just and reasonable.” Thus, the
Commission argues it has jurisdiction over
demand response because it “directly affects
wholesale rates.”
We agree with the Commission that demand
response compensation affects the wholesale
market. Because of the direct link between
wholesale and retail markets, a change in one
market will inevitably beget a change in the
other. Reducing retail consumption—
through demand response payments—will
lower the wholesale price. Demand response
will also increase system reliability. Because
incentive-driven demand response affects the
wholesale market in these ways, the
Commission argues §§ 205 and 206 are clear
grants of agency power to promulgate Order
745.
The Commission’s rationale, however, has
no limiting principle. Without boundaries, §§
205 and 206 could ostensibly authorize
FERC to regulate any number of areas,
including the steel, fuel, and labor markets.
FERC proposes the “affecting” jurisdiction
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can be appropriately limited to “direct
participants” in jurisdictional wholesale
energy markets. But, as this case
demonstrates, the directness of participation
may be a function of the richness of the
incentives
FERC
commands.
The
commission’s authority must be cabined by
something
sturdier
than
creative
characterizations. The “direct participant”
theory also assumes FERC can “lure” nonjurisdictional resources into the wholesale
market in the first place to create jurisdiction,
which is the heart of the Petitioners’
challenge.
The limits of §§ 205 and 206 are best
determined in the context of the overall
statutory scheme. Congressional intent is
clearly articulated in § 201’s text: FERC’s
reach “extend[s] only to those matters which
are not subject to regulation by the States.”
States retain exclusive authority to regulate
the retail market. Absent a “clear and specific
grant of jurisdiction” elsewhere, the agency
cannot regulate areas left to the states. The
broad “affecting” language of §§ 205 and 206
does not erase the specific limits of § 201.1.
Indeed, the Commission agrees its
jurisdiction to regulate practices “affecting”
rates does not “trump[] the express limitation
on its authority to regulate non-wholesale
sales.” Otherwise, FERC could engage in
direct regulation of the retail market
whenever the retail market affects the
wholesale market, which would render the
retail market prohibition useless.
In addition, if FERC’s arguments are
followed to their logical conclusions, priceresponsive demand response—retail demand
response in “FERC speak”—would also

affect jurisdictional rates in the same way as
the type of demand response at issue in
FERC’s rule here, and FERC’s authority
regarding demand response would be almost
limitless. Although the current rule leaves
price-responsive demand untouched, nothing
would stop FERC from expanding this
regulation and encroaching further on state
authority in the future.
Thus, FERC can regulate practices affecting
the wholesale market under §§ 205 and 206,
provided the Commission is not directly
regulating a matter subject to state control,
such as the retail market.
The fact that the Commission is only “luring”
the resource to enter the market instead of
requiring entry does not undercut the force of
Petitioners’ challenge. The lure is change of
the retail rate. Demand response—simply
put—is part of the retail market. It involves
retail customers, their decision whether to
purchase at retail, and the levels of retail
electricity consumption. If FERC had
directed ISOs to give a credit to any
consumer who reduced its expected use of
retail electricity, FERC would be directly
regulating the retail rate. At oral argument,
the Commission conceded crediting would be
an impermissible intrusion into the retail
market. Ordering an ISO to compensate a
consumer for reducing its demand is the same
in substance and effect as issuing a credit.
Thus, while it is true demand response can
occur in two ways—through a response to
either price change or incentive payments—
nothing about the latter makes it “wholesale.”
A buyer is a buyer, but a reduction in
consumption cannot be a “wholesale sale.”
FERC’s metaphysical distinction between
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price-responsive demand and incentivebased demand cannot solve its jurisdictional
quandary.
Nor does FERC’s reliance on a statement of
congressional policy from the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 save its rule. FERC insists its
actions “are consistent with Congressional
policy requiring federal level facilitation of
demand response, because this final rule is
designed to remove barriers to demand
response participation in the organized
wholesale energy markets FERC’s reliance
on this language is perplexing; if anything,
the policy statement supports the opposite
conclusion, that Congress intended demand
response resources to be regulated by states,
as part of the retail market.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 confirms the
national policy of encouraging and
facilitating “the deployment of [time-based
pricing and other demand response]
technology and devices that enable electricity
customers to participate in such pricing and
demand response systems . . . and
[eliminating] unnecessary barriers to demand
response participation in energy, capacity
and ancillary service markets.” As an initial
matter, even if § 1252(f) supports FERC’s
authority, the Commission cannot rely on the
section for an independent source of power.
Policy statements like § 1252(f) “are just
that—statements of policy. They are not
delegations of regulatory authority.” Thus,
the relevant sections of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 can only be used to “help delineate
the contours of statutory authority.” And
here, those contours do not encompass
federal regulation of demand response.

FERC latches onto the language in § 1252(f)
requiring elimination of “unnecessary
barriers to demand response participation in
energy . . . service markets” to support its
claim that Order 745 advances congressional
policy. In Order 745, however, FERC went
far beyond removing barriers to demand
response resources. Instead of simply
“removing barriers,” the rule draws demand
response resources into the market and then
dictates the compensation providers of such
resources must receive.
We think the title of the section is
noteworthy: “Federal Encouragement of
Demand Response Devices.” “To encourage”
is not “to regulate.” Although the title is “not
dispositive of the provision’s meaning,” “it is
not too much to expect that it has something
to do with the subject matter” of the section.
And here, “review of the statutory text
reveals that [the title] has everything to do
with the subject matter.” See id. The section
dictates demand response is to be
“encouraged” and “facilitated,” not directly
regulated as Order 745 proposes.
This is obvious when § 1252(f) is read in
tandem with § 1252(e), “Demand Response
and Regional Coordination,” which declares
it the “policy of the United States to
encourage States to coordinate, on a regional
basis, State energy policies to provide
reliable and affordable demand response
services to the public.” This language
underscores that states, not the Commission,
regulate demand response. Indeed, § 1252(e)
goes on to note FERC should “provide
technical assistance to States and regional
organizations . . . in . . . developing plans and
programs to use demand response to respond
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to peak demand or emergency needs.” The
Commission is also to prepare an annual
report, assessing demand response resources.
Thus, the Energy Policy Act clarifies FERC’s
authority over demand response resources is
limited: its role is to assist and advise state
and regional programs.
Even more importantly, the Energy Policy
Act statements show Congress understood
the importance of demand response resources
to the wholesale market—an importance
Petitioners do not dispute. Yet, despite this
significant impact on the wholesale market,
Congress left regulation of this aspect of
retail demand up to the states, rather than to
the federal government.
Because
the
Federal
Power
Act
unambiguously restricts FERC from
regulating the retail market, we need not
reach Chevron step two. But even if we
assumed the statute was ambiguous—as
Judge Edwards argues, we would find
FERC’s construction of it to be unreasonable
for the same reasons we find the statute
unambiguous. Because FERC’s rule entails
direct regulation of the retail market—a
matter exclusively within state control—it
exceeds the Commission’s authority.
Alternatively, even if we assume FERC had
statutory authority to execute the Rule in the
first place, Order 745 would still fail because
it was arbitrary and capricious.
Under the APA, we must set aside orders that
are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” In particular, “it most
emphatically remains the duty of this court to

ensure that an agency engage the arguments
raised before it.”
A review of the record reveals FERC failed
to properly consider—and engage—
Commissioner Moeller’s reasonable (and
persuasive) arguments, reiterating the
concerns of Petitioners and other parties, that
Order 745 will result in unjust and
discriminatory rates. Moeller argued Order
745 “overcompensat[es]” demand response
resources because it “requires that demand
resource[s] be paid the full LMP plus be
allowed to retain the savings associated with
[the provider’s] avoided retail generation
cost.” The Commission then responded that
demand response resources are comparable
to generation resources and should therefore
receive the same level of compensation. Yet
comparable contributions cannot be the
reason for equal compensation, when
generation resources are incomparably
saddled with generation costs. Nor can FERC
justify its current overcompensation by
pointing to past undercompensation.
Although we need not delve now into the
dispute among experts, the potential windfall
to demand response resources seems
troubling, and the Commissioner’s concerns
are
certainly
valid.
Indeed,
“overcompensation cannot be just and
reasonable,” and the Commission has not
adequately explained how their system
results in just compensation.
The Commission cannot simply talk around
the arguments raised before it; reasoned
decisionmaking requires more: a “direct
response,” which FERC failed to provide
here. Thus, if FERC thinks its jurisdictional
struggles are its only concern with Order 745,
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it is mistaken. We would still vacate the Rule
if we engaged the Petitioners’ substantive
arguments.
Ultimately, given Order 745’s direct
regulation of the retail market, we vacate the
rule in its entirety as ultra vires agency
action.
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate and
remand the rulings under review.
So ordered.
EDWARDS,
dissenting:

Senior

Circuit

Judge,

Under the Federal Power Act, regulatory
authority over the nation’s electricity markets
is bifurcated between the States and the
federal government. In simplified terms, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC” or “Commission”) has authority
over wholesale electricity sales but not retail
electricity sales, with the latter solely subject
to State regulation. The consolidated
petitions before the court call on us to parse
this jurisdictional line between FERC’s
wholesale jurisdiction and the States’ retail
jurisdiction – a line which this court and the
Supreme Court have recognized is neither
neat nor tidy.
Petitioners challenge Order 745, a rule
imposing certain compensation requirements
on the administrators of the nation’s
wholesale electricity markets. The rule
requires
these
wholesale-market
administrators
–
called
Regional
Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) and
Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) – to
compensate so-called “demand response
resources” at a specified price when certain

conditions are met. As relevant here,
“demand response resources” are essentially
electricity consumers, often bundled together
by a third-party aggregator, who agree to
reduce their electricity consumption in
exchange for incentive payments. The pun
scattered throughout the record is that while
generators produce megawatts, consumers
produce “negawatts.” In effect, Order 745
requires that, at certain times, megawatts and
negawatts receive the same amount of
payment in wholesale markets, an amount
called the “locational marginal price” or
“LMP.”
Although the challenged rule requires ISOs
and RTOs to pay demand response resources
a specified compensation (LMP), this
requirement is applicable only when two
conditions are met: (1) when the demand
response resource is capable of balancing
supply and demand in the wholesale market,
and (2) when compensating the demand
response resource is cost-effective under a
“net benefits test” prescribed by the rule. The
specific mechanics of these conditions and of
the “net benefits test” are less important than
what they accomplish. The critical point here
is that, because of the specified conditions,
Order 745 requires compensation of demand
response resources only when their
participation in a wholesale electricity market
actually lowers the market-clearing price for
wholesale electricity.
With these basics in hand, it is easy to see
why FERC stated in its rulemaking that
“jurisdiction over demand response is a
complex matter that lies at the confluence of
state and federal jurisdiction.” On one view,
the demand response resources subject to the
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rule directly affect the wholesale price of
electricity. That is, the final rule’s conditions
operate to ensure that every negawatt of
forgone
consumption
receiving
compensation reduces both the quantity of
electricity produced and its wholesale price.
Focusing on this direct effect – direct, it bears
repeating, because under the rule’s
conditions all demand response resources
receiving compensation reduce the marketclearing price – it is easy to conceive of Order
745 as permissibly falling on the wholesale
side of the wholesale-retail jurisdictional
line. On another view, however, the
electricity not consumed thanks to the rule’s
compensation payments would have been
consumed first in a retail market.
Focusing on the market in which the
consumption would have occurred in the first
instance, one can conceive of Order 745 as
impermissibly falling on the retail side of the
jurisdictional line.
The task for this court, of course, is not to
divine from first principles whether a demand
response resource subject to Order 745 is best
considered a matter of wholesale or retail
electricity regulation. Rather, our task is one
of statutory interpretation within the familiar
Chevron framework. The Commission has
interpreted the Federal Power Act to permit it
to issue Order 745. And it falls to this court
to determine whether the Act unambiguously
“sp[eaks] to the precise question,” (Chevron
step one), and, if not, whether the
Commission’s interpretation is a permissible
construction of the statute (Chevron step
two).
Though the rule and its operation are highly
technical, the primary jurisdictional issue

raised in these consolidated petitions turns on
a rather straightforward question of statutory
interpretation: whether a promise to forgo
consumption of electricity that would have
been purchased in a retail electricity market
unambiguously constitutes a “sale of electric
energy” under section 201(b)(1) of the
Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). If
so, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to
issue Order 745 because section 201(b)(1) of
the Act states, in relevant part, that the
“provisions of this subchapter shall apply . . .
to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce, but . . . shall not apply
to any other sale of electric energy.”
The statute, to my mind, is ambiguous
regarding whether forgone consumption
constitutes a “sale” under section 201(b)(1).
Because of this ambiguity, the Act is also
ambiguous as to whether a rule requiring
administrators of wholesale markets to pay a
specified level of compensation for such
forgone consumption constitutes “direct
regulation” of retail sales that would
contravene the limitations of section 201.
Because the Act is ambiguous regarding
FERC’s authority to require ISOs and RTOs
to pay demand response resources, we are
obliged to defer under Chevron to the
Commission’s permissible construction of “a
statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope
of the agency’s statutory authority (that is, its
jurisdiction).”
Absent an affirmative limitation under
section 201, there is no doubt that demand
response participation in wholesale markets
and the ISOs’ and RTOs’ market rules
concerning such participation constitute
“practice[s] . . . affecting” wholesale rates
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under section 206 of the Act. Petitioners’
arguments to the contrary ignore the direct
effect that the ISOs’ and RTOs’ market rules
have on wholesale electricity rates squarely
within FERC’s jurisdiction. The Commission
has authority to “determine the just and
reasonable . . . practice” by setting a level of
compensation for demand response resources
that, in its expert judgment, will ensure that
the rates charged in wholesale electricity
markets are “just and reasonable.” It was
therefore reasonable for the Commission to
conclude that it could issue Order 745 under
the Act’s “affecting” jurisdiction.
In addition to challenging FERC’s
jurisdiction, Petitioners argue that its
decision to mandate compensation equal to
the LMP was arbitrary and capricious.
Petitioners
believe
that
the
LMP
overcompensates demand response resources
since they also realize savings from not
having to purchase retail electricity. The
Commission, Petitioners insist, should have
set the compensation level at the LMP minus
the retail cost of the forgone electricity. But
the Commission’s decision in this regard was
reasonable and adequately explained.
For these reasons, explained below in greater
detail, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem
To understand this case, one must appreciate
the scope and significance of the problem
FERC sought to address in Order 745. Three
characteristics of the nation’s electricity
market go a long way toward framing the
problem. First, electricity, unlike most

commodities, cannot be stored for later use.
There must instead be a continual,
contemporaneous matching of supply to meet
current electricity demand. Second, not all
power plants are created equal: some are
efficient and cheap; others, inefficient and
expensive. Third, most retail consumers are
charged a fixed price for electricity that does
not adjust in the moment to temporary spikes
in the cost of producing electricity.
The first two characteristics, in tandem, cause
significant fluctuations in the cost of
supplying electricity at different times of day.
During periods of regular electricity
consumption, only the efficient and cheap
power plants need be deployed. But at hours
of peak usage (e.g., a summer afternoon in
Washington, D.C. when countless air
conditioners toil against the humidity and
heat), the suppliers of electricity must
marshal the least efficient and most costly
power plants to match the soaring demand for
electricity. It is because electricity cannot be
efficiently stored that these periods of peak
demand must be met with new generation and
not stockpiled supply.
In a perfect market, or even in a wellfunctioning market, the skyrocketing cost of
producing additional electricity at hours of
peak usage would be reflected in temporarily
higher prices charged to consumers. In turn,
this increased price would reduce the
megawatts of electricity demanded, as some
individuals and businesses would, for
example, turn off their air conditioners to
save money. The market would thereby reach
an efficient equilibrium.
But here is where the third characteristic of
electricity markets comes in. Retail
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electricity prices are generally regulated to
remain constant over longer periods of time.
That is, consumers do not pay different
amounts during different hours of the day,
notwithstanding the sharply vacillating cost
of producing electricity. Electricity demand
thus does not respond to time-sensitive price
signals. As a result, there are times when
people and businesses consume electricity
that costs more to produce than it is worth to
them to consume. This is inefficient.
Wholesale electricity markets, which are
under FERC’s jurisdiction, suffer the same
inefficiency. Since retail demand is not priceresponsive, the aggregate amount of
electricity demanded in the wholesale market
by the entities that serve retail customers is
also uncoupled from the time-specific price
of supplying electricity. In economic terms,
the demand for electricity in the wholesale
market is inelastic.
The Commission recognizes the problem. As
it observed in its order denying requests for
rehearing of Order 745,
[a] properly functioning market
should reflect both the willingness of
sellers to sell at a price and the
willingness of buyers to purchase at a
price. In an RTO- or ISO-run market,
however, buyers are generally unable
to directly express their willingness to
pay for a product at the price offered.
As discussed later, RTOs and ISOs
cannot isolate individual buyers’
willingness to pay which results in
extremely inelastic demand.
B. FERC’s Solution
Having identified a problem in the wholesale
electricity market, the Commission has a

statutory obligation to do what it can to fix it.
That is because FERC is charged under the
Federal Power Act with ensuring that
wholesale electricity rates are “just and
reasonable.” It must ensure that all “rates and
charges made, demanded, or received by any
public utility for or in connection with the . .
. sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission” are “just and
reasonable.” And when FERC determines
that a “practice . . . affecting” such a rate is
unjust or unreasonable, it must itself
determine and fix “the just and reasonable . .
. practice . . . to be thereafter observed.”
Consistent with its statutory duty and in view
of the market distortions caused by inelastic
wholesale demand, the Commission has
initiated a series of reforms to open wholesale
markets to “demand response resources.” For
our purposes, “demand response resources”
are resources that are capable of reducing
“the consumption of electric energy by
customers from their expected consumption
in response . . . to incentive payments
designed to induce lower consumption of
electric energy.” Put simply, demand
response resources agree not to purchase
electricity in exchange for payment.
The basic premise of FERC’s demandresponse reforms is that there are two ways
that wholesale-market administrators (i.e.,
ISOs and RTOs) can balance wholesale
supply and demand: by increasing the supply
of electricity or by decreasing the demand for
it. An ISO or RTO reduces wholesale
demand when it pays a demand response
resource because that resource will forgo
electricity consumption in the retail market,
which, in turn, will lead to fewer megawatts
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of electricity being demanded in the
aggregate in that ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale
market. At certain times (e.g., summer
afternoons in Washington, D.C.), paying
incentive payments to induce consumers not
to consume electricity may be cheaper than
paying generators to produce more power;
negawatts, in such circumstances, are the
cheaper
alternative.
And
because,
functionally, there is little difference to
wholesale-market administrators between a
megawatt and a negawatt (both assist equally
in the administrator’s task of bringing
wholesale demand and supply into
equipoise), demand response resources are
capable of competing directly with traditional
generation resources so long as the
appropriate market rules are in place.
For some years now, FERC has recognized
that the direct participation of demand
response resources in wholesale markets
improves the functioning of these markets in
several respects. First, it lowers wholesale
prices because “lower demand means a lower
wholesale price.” Second, it mitigates the
market power of suppliers of electricity
because they have to compete with demand
response resources and adjust their bidding
strategy accordingly. Third, demand
response “enhances system reliability,” for
example, by “reducing electricity demand at
critical times (e.g., when a generator or a
transmission line unexpectedly fails).”
The benefits of demand response
participating in wholesale markets are
beyond reproach. Commissioner Moeller,
who dissented in Order 745, put it best:
While the merits of various methods
for compensating demand response

were discussed at length in the course
of this rulemaking, nowhere did I
review any comment or hear any
testimony that questioned the benefit
of having demand response resources
participate in the organized wholesale
energy markets. On this point, there is
no debate. The fact is that demand
response plays a very important role
in these markets by providing
significant economic, reliability, and
other market-related benefits.
It is no surprise, then, that FERC has initiated
a series of reforms to open up its markets to
demand response, on the theory that doing so
helps to ensure “just and reasonable”
wholesale rates by improving how these
markets function in the three ways just
mentioned.
In particular, in Order 719 FERC required
ISOs and RTOs to “accept bids from demand
response resources in RTOs’ and ISOs’
markets for certain ancillary services on a
basis comparable to other resources” and, in
certain circumstances, to “permit an
aggregator of retail customers . . . to bid
demand response on behalf of retail
customers directly into the organized energy
market.” But FERC placed an important
condition on this requirement; ISOs and
RTOs were required to accept bids from
demand response “unless not permitted by
the laws or regulations of the relevant electric
retail regulatory authority.” Finally,
recognizing that “further reforms may be
necessary to eliminate barriers to demand
response in the future,” FERC further ordered
ISOs and RTOs to “assess and report on any
remaining barriers to comparable treatment
of demand response resources that are within
the Commission’s jurisdiction.”
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And further reforms were indeed necessary.
Prior to issuing Order 745, ISOs and RTOs
had differing practices concerning the level
of compensation to be paid to demand
response resources in their markets. The
Commission found that many ISOs and
RTOs undercompensated demand response
resources in certain circumstances. It reached
this finding in light of existing barriers to
demand response participation in wholesale
markets, including “the lack of market
incentives to invest in enabling technologies
that would allow electric customers and
aggregators of retail customers to see and
respond to changes in marginal costs of
providing electric service as those costs
change.”
Order 745 sought to correct the
undercompensation problem by mandating
that ISOs and RTOs pay demand response
resources the same market price that they pay
to generators, i.e., LMP. But it limited this
compensation requirement to circumstances
where two specific conditions are met. LMPcompensation would be required only when
(1) “the demand response resource [is] able
to displace a generation resource in a manner
that serves the RTO or ISO in balancing
supply and demand,” and (2) “the payment of
LMP . . . [is] cost-effective, as determined by
[a] net benefits test.”
FERC understood that it had authority to
correct the undercompensation problem
because, in the absence of adequate
compensation, too few demand response
resources affirmatively bid into the wholesale
markets. And such participation is necessary
for the market to function rationally and

reach “just and reasonable” rates. As FERC
stated:
We find, based on the record here
that, when a demand response
resource has the capability to balance
supply and demand as an alternative
to a generation resource, and when . .
. paying LMP to that demand
response resource is shown to be costeffective as determined by the net
benefits test described herein,
payment by an RTO or ISO of
compensation other than the LMP is
unjust and unreasonable. When these
conditions are met, we find that
payment of LMP to these resources
will result in just and reasonable rates
for ratepayers.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Petitioners argue that Order 745 is “in
excess” of FERC’s “statutory jurisdiction.”
We evaluate this contention under Chevron
and defer to FERC’s permissible construction
of its authorizing statute, regardless of
“whether the interpretive question presented
is ‘jurisdictional.’” The proper question is
thus whether the Act unambiguously
forecloses FERC from issuing Order 745
under its “affecting” jurisdiction.
FERC’s explanation of its jurisdiction under
the Federal Power Act is straightforward and
sensible. FERC has the authority and
responsibility to correct any “practice . . .
affecting” wholesale electricity rates that the
Commission determines to be “unjust” or
“unreasonable.” In its view, the ISOs’ and
RTOs’ rules governing the participation of
demand response resources in the nation’s
wholesale electricity markets are “practices
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affecting [wholesale electricity] rates.” That
is, an ISO’s or RTO’s market rules governing
how a demand response resource may
compete in its wholesale market, including
the terms by which a demand response
resource is to be compensated in the market,
are “practices affecting” that wholesale
market’s rates for electricity. And FERC has
determined that an ISO’s or RTO’s
“practice” is unjust and unreasonable to the
degree that it inadequately compensates
demand response resources capable of
supplanting more expensive generation
resources. As explained above, FERC has
found that demand response improves the
functioning of wholesale markets by (1)
lowering the wholesale price of electricity,
(2) exerting downward pressure on
generators’ market power, and (3) enhancing
system reliability.
FERC’s explanation is consistent with our
case law. In Connecticut, we considered
whether FERC has jurisdiction to review an
ISO’s capacity charges. Capacity is not
electricity but the ability to produce it when
needed, and in Connecticut the ISO had
established a market where capacity
providers
–
generators,
prospective
generators, and demand response resources –
competitively bid to meet the ISO’s capacity
needs three years in the future. Generation,
like retail sales, is expressly the domain of
State regulation under section 201, and the
petitioners argued that by increasing the
overall capacity requirement the ISO was
improperly requiring the installation of new
generation resources. We disagreed and held
that FERC had “affecting” jurisdiction under
section 206 because “capacity decisions . . .
affect FERC-jurisdictional transmission rates

for that system without directly implicating
generation facilities.” That the capacity
requirement helped to “find the right price”
was enough of an effect to satisfy section
206.
Petitioners’ specific arguments against
FERC’s
exercising
jurisdiction
are
unpersuasive. First, Petitioners note that
section 201 of the Act establishes a clear
jurisdictional line between “the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce,” which is properly the subject of
FERC’s jurisdiction, and “any other sale of
electric energy.” According to Petitioners,
the Commission has transgressed this line
because it “has ordered ISOs and RTOs to
pay retail customers for reducing their retail
purchases of electricity.”
But this argument mischaracterizes the rule
and papers over a key ambiguity. First, the
mischaracterization: Petitioners are wrong
inasmuch as they imply that FERC requires
all ISOs and RTOs to pay demand response
resources a minimum level of compensation
(LMP). The compensation requirement
promulgated in Order 745 does not apply
unless an ISO or RTO “has a tariff provision
permitting demand response resources to
participate as a resource in the energy
market.” And the regulation’s requirement
that ISOs and RTOs accept bids from demand
response resources comes with a key caveat:
the requirement applies “unless not permitted
by the laws or regulations of the relevant
electric retail regulatory authority.” In other
words, there is a carve-out from the
compensation requirement for ISOs and
RTOs in States where local regulatory law
stands in the way. Thus, the Order preserves
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State regulation of retail markets. This is
hardly the stuff of grand agency overreach.
More fundamentally, Petitioners’ argument
founders on a statutory ambiguity they
ignore. Section 201 makes clear that FERC
may regulate “the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce” but not
“any other sale of electric energy.” (emphasis
added). The demand response at issue here is
forgone consumption, which is no “sale” at
all. Perhaps the phrase “any other sale of
electric energy” could be interpreted to
include non-sales that would have been sales
in the retail market, but it certainly does not
require such a reading. It is reasonable to
categorize demand response as neither a
retail sale nor wholesale sale under the
Federal Power Act. And on this
understanding, section 201 “says nothing
about”
FERC’s
power
to
review
compensation rates for demand response in
wholesale electricity markets.
Nor is Petitioners’ argument under section
201 made any stronger by reference to
subsection (a). This prefatory subsection
states that while “Federal regulation . . . of
electric energy in interstate commerce and
the sale of such energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce is necessary in the
public interest,” federal regulation should
“extend only to those matters which are not
subject to regulation by the States.” But the
Supreme Court has made clear that “the
precise reserved state powers language in §
201(a)” is a “mere policy declaration that
cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of
jurisdiction, even if the particular grant
seems inconsistent with the broadly
expressed purpose.”

The most that can be said of section 201 is
that it commits regulation of retail sales to the
States and regulation of wholesale sales to
the Commission. And while it is true that the
forgone consumption would have been
purchased in the first instance in the retail
market, it does not follow from this fact that
non-consumption constitutes an “other sale”
under section 201(b). There was no sale,
period. And the statute does not give a clear
indication that Congress intended to
foreclose FERC from regulating non-sales
that have a direct effect on the wholesale
markets under FERC’s jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the Federal Power Act
requires demand response resources to be
considered inextricably part of retail “sales”
subject solely to State regulation, Order 745
does not engage in the type of “direct
regulation” that would violate section 201.
Order 745 does not require anything of retail
electricity consumers and leaves it to the
States to decide whether to permit demand
response. All Order 745 says is that if a
State’s laws permit demand response to be
bid into electricity markets, and if a demand
response resource affirmatively decides to
participate in an ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale
electricity market, and if that demand
response resource would in a particular
circumstance allow the ISO or RTO to
balance wholesale supply and demand, and if
paying that demand resource would be a net
benefit to the system, then the ISO or RTO
must pay that resource the LMP. That is it.
This requirement will no doubt affect how
much electricity is consumed by a small
subset of retail consumers who elect to
participate as demand response resources in
wholesale markets. But that fact does not
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render Order 745 “direct regulation” of the
retail market. Authority over retail rates and
over whether to permit demand response
remains vested solely in the States.
In this respect, Order 745 is similar to the
capacity rule in Connecticut that we found
did not directly regulate generation facilities.
Even though increasing the capacity
requirement incentivized the procurement of
additional
resources,
including
new
generation facilities, to meet the higher
requirement, we recognized that States
retained their ultimate authority over the
construction of new generation facilities.
And because the capacity requirements could
be met in other ways aside from building new
generators (e.g., through demand response or
capacity contracts), it was irrelevant that
“public utilities . . . overwhelmingly
responded
to
[increased
capacity
requirements] by choosing to allow
construction of new facilities over other
alternatives.” The lesson of Connecticut is
that FERC can indirectly incentivize action
that it cannot directly require so long as it is
otherwise acting within its jurisdiction – and
that doing so does not constitute
impermissible direct regulation of an area
reserved to the States. So too here: Order 745
may encourage more demand response, but
States retain the ultimate authority to approve
the practice.
Second, Petitioners argue that the FERC’s
“affecting” jurisdiction under sections 205
and 206 of the Act “does not extend so far as
to allow the Commission to regulate directly
the retail services that are expressly carved
out from the scope of its jurisdiction.” To a
large degree, this argument simply rehashes

Petitioners’ erroneous reading of section 201
and fails for the reasons just described.
Demand response resources are promises to
forgo consumption of electricity and
therefore are not retail “sales.” This is not
changed by the fact that forgone consumption
would have taken place in the first instance in
a retail market. Because of this, the
Commission’s
asserting
“affecting”
jurisdiction over demand response does not,
as Petitioners suggest, “nullify[]” a limitation
set forth in section 201.
To be sure, section 206 cannot be read to
displace unambiguous jurisdictional limits
imposed by section 201(b). Suppose, for
example, that FERC issued a rule requiring
ISOs and RTOs to condition all wholesale
sales of electricity on load-serving entities’
agreeing to charge retail customers with realtime pricing that adjusted hourly for
variations in the cost of producing electricity.
Such a rule would unambiguously regulate
each retail “sale” because it would mandate a
particular form of compensation for actual –
not counterfactual – retail sales. Thus, while
price-responsive retail pricing would no
doubt “affect” the wholesale rate, FERC
could not claim jurisdiction under sections
205 and 206 because the subchapter which
includes these sections “shall not apply to any
other sale of electric energy.” This example
plainly differs from the present case because
demand response resources are forgone sales
or non-sales, and therefore it is at best
ambiguous whether the limitation in section
201(b) applies.
To bolster their case, Petitioners invoke the
specter of limitless federal authority if FERC
is permitted to exercise “affecting”
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jurisdiction to issue Order 745. They caution
that
“the
Commission’s
expansive
interpretation of its ‘affecting’ jurisdiction
would allow it to regulate any number of
activities – such as the purchase or sale of
steel, fuel, labor, and other inputs influencing
the cost to generate or transmit electricity –
merely by redefining the activities as
‘practices’ that affect wholesale rates.”
This argument cannot carry the day because
it ignores at least two important limits. It first
ignores section 201’s limit proscribing any
“direct regulation” of retail sales (which
would bar the hypothetical rule, discussed
above, in which FERC tries to mandate that
retail sales have dynamic, time-responsive
pricing). It also ignores the limitations we
announced in CAISO. There, we held that
FERC exceeded its jurisdiction when it
replaced the board members of an ISO on the
theory that the composition of the ISO’s
board was a “practice . . . affecting [a] rate”
under section 206(a). We held that “section
206’s empowering of the Commission to
assess the justness and reasonableness of
practices affecting rates of electric utilities is
limited to those methods or ways of doing
things on the part of the utility that directly
affect the rate or are closely related to the rate,
not all those remote things beyond the rate
structure that might in some sense indirectly
or ultimately do so.”
These limits foreclose the parade of horribles
marshaled by Petitioners. Like replacing the
ISO’s board of directors in CAISO, FERC
could not, consistent with Circuit precedent,
regulate markets in steel, fuel, labor, and
other inputs for generating electricity, which
constitute “remote things beyond the rate

structure that might in some sense indirectly
or ultimately” affect the wholesale rate of
electricity.
Order 745 passes the CAISO test quite
comfortably because the demand response
resources subject to the rule have a
quintessentially “direct” effect on wholesale
rates. The rule’s compensation requirement
applies only when an ISO or RTO can use the
demand response resource in lieu of a
generation resource to balance supply and
demand, and only when paying a demand
response resource is cost-effective under the
rule’s net benefits test. Order 745 thus does
not purport to regulate demand response writ
large; its compensation requirement applies
only when the demand response by definition
alters the wholesale electricity price. That is
about as “direct” an effect and as clear a
“nexus” with the wholesale transaction as can
be imagined. There can be little doubt that
FERC has the authority to review the justness
and reasonableness of rates that are so closely
connected with the healthy functioning of its
jurisdictional markets; this, as we said in
Connecticut, is the “heartland of the
Commission’s section 206 jurisdiction.”
Third,
Petitioners
argue
that
the
Commission’s orders exceed its jurisdiction
because “they unreasonably interfere with
existing state and local programs addressing
retail customer ‘demand response.’” Any
such effect, however, is merely incidental. As
the Commission correctly observed, Order
745 “does not directly affect retail-level
demand response programs, nor does it
require that demand response resources offer
into the wholesale market only. Indeed, the
organized wholesale energy markets can and
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do operate simultaneously with retail-level
programs . . . .” FERC’s reforms in Order 745
run on a parallel track with State-level
reforms. And to the degree that FERC’s
reforms incidentally affect parallel Statelevel initiatives, that does not render FERC’s
actions improper.
***
To summarize: FERC’s jurisdiction turns on
two issues: (1) whether demand response is a
retail “sale” or is otherwise unambiguously
committed to State regulation under the
Federal Power Act, and (2) whether sections
205 and 206 clearly grant jurisdiction to
FERC to regulate how wholesale-market
administrators compensate demand response
resources that “directly affect” wholesale
prices. Unless we inject quasi-philosophy
into our Chevron analysis (what is the sound
of one hand clapping? what is the true nature
of a sale that was never made? of megawatts
never consumed?), I think it clear that the
Federal Power Act does not precisely address
the first question; forgone consumption is not
unambiguously a “sale,” nor does the statute
dictate that demand response be treated
solely as a matter of retail regulation. And the
second question is resolved, in my view, by
the terms of Order 745 which narrowly apply
only to demand response resources that by
definition directly affect the wholesale rates
of electricity. This falls squarely within the
Commission’s “affecting” jurisdiction. The
proper course for this court is to defer to the
Commission’s
well-reasoned
and
permissible interpretation of its authority
under the statute.
B. Level of Compensation

Petitioners also argue that Order 745 is
arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A). In reviewing such claims, we
consider whether FERC “examine[d] the
relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the
choice made.” We also afford significant
deference to FERC in light of the highly
technical regulatory landscape that is its
purview. Indeed, “the Commission enjoys
broad discretion to invoke its expertise in
balancing competing interests and drawing
administrative lines.” And we “afford great
deference to the Commission” in cases
involving ratemaking decisions as the
“statutory requirement that rates be ‘just and
reasonable’ is obviously incapable of precise
judicial definition.” Finally, to the extent that
the Commission bases its actions on factual
findings, such findings are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioners’ chief complaint is that Order 745
sets the required compensation level for
demand response at the LMP (recall:
locational marginal price). LMP equals “the
marginal value of an increase in supply or a
reduction in consumption at each node
within” an ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale market,
and is the compensation generation resources
generally receive. Petitioners complain that
demand response resources already get the
benefit of the forgone expense of retail
electricity (abbreviated in the record as “G”).
Therefore, Petitioners contend that, under
FERC’s rule, demand response resources
effectively receive a “double payment”: LMP
plus G. Br. of Pet’rs at 47. According to
Petitioners, requiring LMP compensation
thus results in unjust and discriminatory
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overcompensation
resources.

of

demand

response

It is of course true, as the majority observes,
that FERC is “bounded by the requirements
of reasoned decisionmaking.” Therefore,
FERC was required to provide a “direct
response” to the Petitioners’ and the
dissenting Commissioner’s concerns about
overcompensation. This is precisely what the
Commission did in carefully explaining how
Order 745’s setting compensation at the LMP
was neither discriminatory nor unjust.
To begin with, FERC provided a thorough
explanation for why compensating demand
response at the LMP (and not LMP - G) was
neither unjust nor over-compensatory. It
explained that such compensation was
necessary to encourage an adequate level of
demand response participation in wholesale
markets in light of existing market barriers.
That last part – the market barriers – is the
key. The Commission has identified
numerous barriers preventing adequate
participation of demand response in
wholesale markets. Indeed, citing record
evidence, the Commission explained that
“the inadequate compensation mechanisms
in place today in wholesale energy markets
fail to induce sufficient investment in
demand response resource infrastructure and
expertise that could lead to adequate levels of
demand response procurement.” FERC
further explained that “a lack of incentives to
invest in enabling technologies can be
addressed by making additional investment
resources available to market participants”
and that paying LMP “to demand response
will provide the proper level of investment
resources
available
for
capital

improvements.” In view of these barriers, and
the value of demand response participation to
ensuring “just and reasonable” wholesale
rates, the Commission concluded that LMP
was the appropriate level of compensation.
FERC sums it up well:
The Commission acknowledged that
noted experts differed on whether
paying LMP in the current
circumstances facing the wholesale
electric market is a reasonable price.
In determining that LMP is the just
and reasonable price to pay for
demand response, the Commission
examined some of the previously
recognized barriers to demand
response that exist in current
wholesale markets. These barriers
create an inelastic demand curve in
the wholesale energy market that
results in higher wholesale prices than
would be observed if the demand side
of the market were fully developed.
The Commission found that paying
LMP when cost-effective may help
remove these barriers to entry of
potential demand response resources,
and, thereby, help move prices closer
to the levels that would result if all
demand could respond to the
marginal price of energy.
With respect to the argument that utilizing the
LMP is somehow discriminatory because
incomparable resources are paid comparable
amounts, the Commission offered reasonable
grounds for treating demand response as
comparable to generation resources. The
Commission observed that, from the
perspective of an ISO or RTO, a demand
response resource was comparable to a
generation resource inasmuch as demand
response is equally capable of balancing
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wholesale supply and demand. This is not the
sum total of the explanation, however. In the
same section of its order, the Commission
explained that “examining cost avoidance by
demand response resources is not consistent
with the treatment of generation. In the
absence of market power concerns, the
Commission generally does not examine
each of the costs of production for individual
resources participating as supply resources in
the organized wholesale electricity markets.”
FERC continued: “we note that certain
generators may receive benefits or savings in
the form of credits or in other forms. In these
cases, the generators realize a value of LMP
plus the credit or savings, but ISOs or RTOs
do not take such benefits or savings into
account in determining how much to pay
those resources.” The point is that the
comparability of compensation is assessed
without regard to outside costs and credits;
just as two generators are both compensated
at the LMP even though only one might be
receiving a tax credit for producing energy,
so too with comparing demand response
resources to generation resources. This was
clearly explained, and it is reasonable.
This court has no business second-guessing
the Commission’s judgment on the level of
compensation.
Whatever policy disagreements one might
have with Order 745’s decision to
compensate demand response resources at
the LMP (and there are legitimate
disagreements to be had), the rule does not
fail for want of reasoned decisionmaking.
FERC’s judgment is owed deference because

it has put forth a reasonable multi-step
explanation of its decision to mandate LMP
compensation. First, responsive demand is a
necessary component of a well-functioning
wholesale market, and FERC understood that
its obligation to ensure just and reasonable
rates required it to facilitate an adequate level
of demand response participation in its
jurisdictional markets. Second, FERC
concluded that market barriers were
inhibiting an adequate level of demand
response participation. Third, FERC
concluded that mandating LMP would
provide the proper incentives for demand
response resources to overcome these
barriers to participation in the wholesale
market.
III. CONCLUSION
FERC had jurisdiction to issue Order 745
because
demand
response
is
not
unambiguously a matter of retail regulation
under the Federal Power Act, and because the
demand response resources subject to the rule
directly affect wholesale electricity prices.
And the Commission’s decision to require
compensation equal to the LMP, rather than
LMP - G, was not arbitrary or capricious. The
majority disagrees on both points. The
unfortunate consequence is that a promising
rule of national significance – promulgated
by the agency that has been authorized by
Congress to address the matters in issue – is
laid aside on grounds that I think are
inconsistent with the statute, at odds with
applicable precedent, and impossible to
square with our limited scope of review. I
therefore respectfully dissent.

145

146

“Supreme Court to Rule on Breaks for Cutting Peak-Demand
Energy Use”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes & Chris Mooney
May 4, 2015
The Supreme Court announced Monday that
it will review whether a federal agency may
require electric market operators to
compensate customers who lower their
consumption of electricity during peak
demand hours.
The court said it would determine whether
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) exceeded its statutory authority
when in 2011 it adopted the approach, which
is called “demand response.”
Environmentalists, the Obama administration
and some large consumers say demand
response is a key mechanism for getting
people to use less energy overall and,
therefore, producing fewer emissions of
carbon dioxide or other harmful pollutants.

FERC’s rule would have ensured that
companies or individuals get compensated
for voluntarily reducing their power usage at
peak demand. “A market functions
effectively only when both supply and
demand can meaningfully participate,”
FERC noted in promulgating the rule.
The agency also said in its brief to the
Supreme Court, “Demand response, by
decreasing the amount of power necessary to
balance supply and demand, reduces the risk
of system failures like blackouts and curbs
the market power of generators.”
Electricity generators say that FERC’s
proposed compensation is too generous and,
more importantly, is a power grab that
exceeds the authority Congress has given it.

Total electricity demand varies greatly, and
when it peaks — usually in the afternoon or
evening each day, but also seasonally, such
as on very hot days — power companies have
to bring additional power plants online to
service that peak load.

“The Federal Power Act draws a ‘bright line’
distinction between state and federal
jurisdiction over the regulation of sales of
electric power,” said a brief filed by the
Electric Power Supply Association, of which
NRG Energy and Exelon Corp. are members.

In doing so, the companies address the need
for more electricity by adding more supply.
But demand response also can reduce how
much power people or companies use during
these peak times.

Wholesale sales of electricity are subject to
FERC’s jurisdiction, the association asserts,
while retail sales are the exclusive province
of the states.
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A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the
electricity producers on a 2-to-1 vote.

University of Maryland at College Park, said
that the benefits extend beyond those who
take advantage of the program.

“Demand response — simply put — is part of
the retail market,” wrote Circuit Judge Janice
Rogers Brown. “It involves retail customers,
their decision whether to purchase at retail,
and the levels of retail electricity
consumption.”

“Demand response benefits all end-use
consumers by eventually reducing their
electricity prices by billions of dollars per
year,” the brief said. “It also provides a
reliable and effective mechanism for
balancing the grid when demand spikes.”

The Obama administration, supported by
environmentalists and some large consumers,
asked the Supreme Court to reconsider.

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. recused himself
from the case, presumably because of a
financial conflict. That means the case will be
heard by an eight-member court in the term
that begins in October, and a tie vote would
keep the lower court’s ruling in place.

“To the extent demand response reduces
prices, which we believe it does, all
consumers benefit,” says Steven Nadel,
executive director of the American Council
for an Energy-Efficient Economy.

The combined cases are FERC v. Electric
Power Supply Association and EnerNOC v.
Electric Power Supply Association.

A supporting brief filed by a group of large
power consumers, including Alcoa and the
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“FERC Gets Top U.S. Court Hearing on Energy-Conservation Rule”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr & Jonathan Crawford
May 4, 2015
The Obama administration will get a U.S.
Supreme Court hearing as it tries to save a
rule that rewards industrial consumers for
cutting electricity use.
The rule, opposed by the power industry,
benefits smart-grid companies such as
EnerNOC Inc. that help large electricity
consumers reduce their power usage during
peak-demand hours. It’s also backed by large
power consumers, including Alcoa Inc. and
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., that are eyeing
millions of dollars in energy savings.
A federal appeals court said the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission lacked
authority to issue the rule. It requires
wholesale-market operators to pay electricity
users that cut consumption during highdemand periods at the same rate as generators
that produce power. The practice, known as
“demand
response,”
means
stiffer
competition for generators.
“It’s going to lead to a fair amount of
uncertainty for quite some time,” William
Scherman, a former FERC general counsel
who now leads the energy, regulation and
litigation practice at Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP in Washington, said Monday
by phone.
The court will consider the case in the ninemonth term that starts in October, with
arguments likely in November or December,

and a decision by June 2016. FERC’s
payment rule remains in effect.
Rejection of the rule would widen profits for
NRG Energy Inc., FirstEnergy Corp., Exelon
Corp., Dynegy Inc. and American Electric
Power Co., the companies with the most
wholesale electricity sales in PJM
Interconnection LLC’s mid-Atlantic grid,
Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Kit Konolige
wrote in a note to clients Monday.
Mid-Atlantic Grid
The 13-state grid, which has the highest
amount of demand response of all the
regional markets, paid $17.7 million for
consumers to cut their electricity use in 2014,
according to Monitoring Analytics LLC,
based in Eagleville, Pennsylvania, which
oversees the market.
Advocates of demand response say it can cut
air pollution and reduce the need to build
additional power plants. Demand response
helped the grid maintain reliable service
when the system faced potential supply
shortages during the Polar Vortex in January
2014, according to PJM.
“It’s a great day for demand response and
consumers across the country,” Frank Lacey,
a vice president at Comverge Inc., a demandresponse company based in Norcross,
Georgia, said in a phone interview. “We
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believe the court will hold that demand
response is rightfully within the jurisdiction
of FERC and consumers will continue to save
billions of dollars annually because of the
decision.”
Power plant owners that opposed the FERC
plan say it is too generous to energy
consumers.
FERC’s Authority
The court fight centers on the reach of
FERC’s authority. Federal law lets the
commission regulate rates only at the
wholesale level, leaving retail regulation in
the hands of the states.
FERC and the Obama administration contend
that the rule applies only to wholesale rates
and to demand-response providers that are
participating in that market. A divided federal
appeals court in Washington rejected that
reasoning, saying that demand response by
definition “involves retail customers, their
decision whether to purchase at retail and the
levels of retail electricity consumption.”
That appeals court decision was poised to
take effect and void the rule had the Supreme
Court not intervened.
Alito Recusal
Justice Samuel Alito didn’t participate in the
court’s action today. As is customary, Alito
gave no reasons, though his most recent
financial-disclosure form indicated he owned
at least $100,000 of OGE Energy Corp., a

wholesale power
Oklahoma City.

company

based

in

Assuming Alito doesn’t take part in the case,
the administration will have to win the votes
of five of the other eight justices to save the
rule.
PJM said Monday it will include demand
response in a power-capacity auction,
expected to take place by August.
The auction will cover the 12 months starting
in June 2018. Capacity auctions are intended
to give power-plant owners an incentive to
have their generators ready to run when
needed. Aggregators of demand response
also can be paid for assuring that customers
are ready to shut down equipment or lights,
reducing the need for plants to run.
“The demand response case being reviewed
by the Supreme Court involves the energy
market specifically. If the court applies the
decision also to the capacity markets, as the
generators have asked, as much as $100
million of annual net income would be at
stake for Exelon,” Konolige said.
The high court also will consider whether the
appeals court was right to say FERC didn’t
adequately weigh whether the rule will lead
to unjust rates.
The Supreme Court also will hear a related
appeal filed by companies including
EnerNOC and Johnson Controls Inc.’s
EnergyConnect unit.

150

The cases are FERC v. Electric Power Supply
Association, 14-840, and EnerNOC v.
Electric Power Supply Association, 14-841.
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“Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC”
Harvard Law Review
March 10, 2015
The Federal Power Act splits jurisdiction
over the electricity system between the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which regulates the wholesale
market and transmission, and state regulators,
which have authority over retail markets.
However, the seeming clarity of this
jurisdictional divide has been muddied by the
recent advent of “demand response,” in
which consumers are paid for reducing their
energy consumption. Recently, in Electric
Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC (EPSA), the
D.C. Circuit vacated a FERC order that
attempted to regulate the wholesale prices
paid for demand response, on the basis that
the order was beyond FERC’s jurisdiction
due to its impermissible effect on retail
markets. The breadth of the court’s holding
risks confusion in the energy markets and
unnecessarily limits FERC’s regulatory
options.
Demand response offers a partial solution to
inefficiencies in the electricity market. The
typical organizational model for the
electricity market makes a division between
wholesale and retail sectors. The regional
systems relevant to this case are run by
“system operators,” independent entities
responsible for ensuring that energy supplied
in the system’s wholesale market meets the
demand in the system’s retail market.
Because the demand for electricity is not
constant, at times of high demand system
operators must buy power at high prices from
less efficient generators. Due to the

unresponsive nature of retail prices,
consumers have little incentive to reduce
consumption during these peak-demand
periods. Demand response offers a partial
solution. At times of peak consumption,
system operators can reduce the overall cost
of electricity in the system by paying
consumers or groups of consumers, dubbed
“demand response resources” (DRRs), to
reduce their energy consumption.
FERC’s Order 745 attempted to address
perceived problems with the compensation of
demand response in the wholesale market.
Though FERC had previously issued orders
governing the structure of this market as a
whole, Order 745 specifically addressed
payments to DRRs. FERC found that the
rates paid to DRRs by some electric system
operators were too low to adequately
incentivize the development of demand
response. The Order mandated that, in certain
circumstances, a system operator must pay to
DRRs the same price for a forgone megawatt
of consumption that the system operator
would have paid a generator that had
successfully bid that megawatt into the
wholesale market. After notice and comment,
Order 745 was passed by four of FERC’s five
board members over the dissent of
Commissioner Moeller. The Commission
received numerous requests for rehearing,
which it denied. Electric Power Supply
Association, a trade group of power
suppliers, petitioned the D.C. Circuit for
review.
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The D.C. Circuit vacated Order No. 745.
Writing for the court, Judge Brown found
that FERC had exceeded the bounds of its
jurisdiction in issuing Order 745, and that
Order 745 was “arbitrary and capricious.” To
analyze FERC’s claim that it had jurisdiction
over wholesale demand response, Judge
Brown outlined the relevant statutory
provisions. The Act contains two sources of
agency power, and two prohibitions, relevant
to the court’s decision. Section 201(b)(1)
grants FERC jurisdiction over “the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce,” but not over “any other sale,”
which is the domain of the states. Sections
205 and 206 contain a broad ancillary grant
of power over “‘all rules and regulations
affecting . . . rates’ in connection with the
wholesale sale of electric energy.” Finally,
section 201(a) states that “FERC’s reach
‘extend[s] only to those matters which are not
subject to regulation by the States.’” To
determine whether FERC had jurisdiction to
regulate the wholesale price of demand
response, the court recognized that it must
apply the Chevron test, determining first
“whether the statutory text forecloses the
agency’s assertion of authority,” and, if
instead the statute was “silent or ambiguous,”
deferring to “the agency’s reasonable
construction.”
The court began by analyzing the
jurisdictional grants. FERC did not have
jurisdiction under the “sale . . . at wholesale”
language of section 201(b)(1) because
demand response is a non-sale. Next, the
court considered FERC’s argument that it
had jurisdiction under the sections 205 and
206 authorization to regulate practices

“directly affect[ing] wholesale rates.” The
court accepted that wholesale demand
response directly affects wholesale prices,
but found that the Commission’s
characterization of its “affecting” jurisdiction
“ha[d] no limiting principle,” “could
ostensibly authorize FERC to regulate . . . the
steel, fuel, and labor markets,” and would
allow the agency to “‘lure’ non-jurisdictional
resources into the wholesale market . . . to
create jurisdiction” by requiring generous
compensation.
To provide a limiting principle for sections
205 and 206, the court turned to the “overall
statutory scheme.” Noting that under section
201(a), FERC’s “reach ‘extend[s] only to
those matters which are not subject to
regulation by the States,’” the court reasoned
that “[t]he broad ‘affecting’ language of §§
205 and 206 does not erase the specific limits
of § 201. Such limits could not come from
section 201(b)(1)’s exclusion from regulation
of “any other sale”: demand response is not a
sale. Instead, the “statutory scheme as a
whole” showed that demand response, “while
not necessarily a retail sale, is indeed part of
the retail market, which . . . is exclusively
within the state’s jurisdiction.” Finding that
the Act unambiguously foreclosed FERC
jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit invalidated
Order 745.
The court also held that the agency had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing Order
745. FERC had failed, in light of
Commissioner
Moeller’s
“persuasive”
argument that “overcompensation cannot be
just and reasonable,” to “adequately explain[]
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Judge Edwards dissented. He agreed that
Order 745 appeared to fall under FERC’s
“affecting” jurisdiction, but thought that the
limit the D.C. Circuit had previously read
into sections 205 and 206 — that FERC could
regulate only conduct with “direct” effects on
wholesale prices — was sufficient. Because
wholesale demand response directly affects
wholesale prices, Order 745 was a valid
exercise of FERC’s “affecting” jurisdiction
unless barred by section 201(b)(1)’s
preclusion of FERC regulation of “any other
sale of electric energy.” As demand response
could be reasonably construed not to be a
sale,
section
201(b)(1)
did
not
unambiguously
preclude
regulation.
Moreover, section 201(a) could not control
because the Supreme Court had previously
interpreted it to be a “mere policy
declaration.” As the Act did not speak
unambiguously to the precise question of
whether demand response was a retail sale,
Chevron deference to FERC’s interpretation
of the jurisdictional grant was required.
Although the majority established new limits
on sections 205 and 206, the preexisting
limits of the Act and case law adequately
cabined FERC’s jurisdiction. The existence
of these limits, the paucity of statutory
grounding for a limiting principle, and the
availability of an alternative holding all
should have counseled the court either to
have avoided announcing a limiting principle
at all or to have delineated the limits of
sections 205 and 206 more narrowly. Even
assuming that FERC had overstepped in this

instance, the potential breadth of the court’s
holding has caused uncertainty in the
industry and has unduly foreclosed the
possibilities of beneficial regulation.
The statutory grounding for the court’s
limiting principle was shaky; by looking to
the “statutory scheme,” the court derived a
limiting principle from two provisions,
neither of which would have provided that
restriction alone. Although section 201(a)
appears an appealing candidate to supply
limits to FERC’s jurisdiction, Supreme Court
precedent forecloses this possibility. Section
201(a) “declare[s] that . . . Federal regulation
. . . [is] to extend only to those matters which
are not subject to regulation by the States.”
However, it begins a section entitled
“[d]eclaration of policy; application of
subchapter,” and the Supreme Court has
determined section 201(a) to be a “mere
‘policy declaration.’” Had the court sought a
jurisdictional limit in section 201(a) alone,
the decision to deny Chevron deference to
FERC would have been difficult to support:
while (as the court recognized) a specific
limit should trump a general grant of
jurisdiction, it is not clear that section 201(a),
a statement “of great generality,” would
unambiguously trump the general language
of sections 205 and 206, even in light of a
separate “retail sale” limit in section
201(b)(1). The court’s reading of section
201(a) as part of a statutory scheme setting
internal, implicit limits on sections 205 and
206 ignored the section’s status as a general
policy declaration.
Likewise, the court could not have relied
solely upon section 201(b)(1)’s denial of
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FERC jurisdiction over “any other sale[s]”
than those “at wholesale.” The problem in
using section 201(b)(1) to limit the grant of
“affecting jurisdiction” in sections 205 and
206 is that the plain meaning will not easily
support it — section 201(b)(1) speaks of
retail and wholesale “sales,” not markets. A
reliance on section 201(b)(1) to supply limits
would also have been in tension with the
court’s own earlier reading of an identical
term. The term “sale” is used both to grant
and to limit FERC jurisdiction within the
same sentence of section 201(b)(1): “[The
Commission’s jurisdiction] shall apply to . . .
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce, but . . . shall not apply
to any other sale of electric energy . . . .” In
dismissing FERC’s claim of section
201(b)(1) authority, the court relied on the
plain meaning of “sale”: “[D]emand response
is not a wholesale sale of electricity; in fact,
it is not a sale at all.” If section 201(b)(1)
were construed to limit FERC’s jurisdiction
over the retail market, it should logically also
be construed to grant authority over the
wholesale market. Because demand response
falls somewhere between the two, section
201(b)(1) would not unambiguously preclude
FERC regulation of wholesale demand
response.
The court’s search for limits led to a principle
derived from the statutory scheme that
nonetheless is in tension with the rest of the
statute. As the court acknowledged, the plain
text of sections 205 and 206 supports
jurisdiction. Further, it is difficult to find in
the statutory scheme a clear intent against
demand response, which did not exist at the
time of the Act’s passage. In New York v.

FERC, the Supreme Court made the same
point about another emergent phenomenon,
“unbundled transmissions.” The Court
reasoned
that
because
unbundled
transmissions “ha[d] been a recent
development” and “ha[d] never been ‘subject
to regulation by the States,’” section 201(a)
did not preclude FERC jurisdiction. The
same argument applies to demand response
— an emergent phenomenon not previously
subject to state regulation.
The court had several options besides broadly
holding that FERC lacks jurisdiction over
demand response, even if it did not want to
follow Judge Edwards in deferring to the
agency. The fact that the court arrived at the
alternative holding that Order 745 was
arbitrary and capricious meant that the court
did not need to reach the jurisdictional
question at all. An alternative would have
been to rule the present regulation ultra vires
on very narrow grounds. In particular, the
court recognized that FERC’s “lur[ing]” of
customers from the retail to the wholesale
market through preferential rates was “the
heart of the Petitioners’ challenge. The court
could have found that this way of attracting
customers made the regulation an
impermissible intrusion on the retail markets.
Such a finding would have enabled the court
to address the conduct that most troubled the
petitioners, while still leaving room for
wholesale demand response that did not
distort retail customers’ incentives.
The capaciousness of the court’s decision to
locate demand response unambiguously
within the retail “market” has the potential to
lead to jurisdictional confusion. As the case
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itself demonstrates, regulation that occurs at
the first instance in the wholesale market can
now be ruled ultra vires if it has an
impermissibly direct effect on the retail
market (unless it directly regulates a
wholesale sale of electric energy). This result
is problematic, given the court’s recognition
that “a change in one market will inevitably
beget a change in the other.” The
development of both new technologies and
FERC’s regulatory program means that
questions that do not neatly fall in one or the
other of section 201(b)(1)’s categories are
likely to arise more often. Already, FERC’s

entire system of wholesale demand response,
widely agreed to be beneficial, is being
challenged in a FERC hearing.
In EPSA, the court turned to the statutory
scheme to infer a limiting principle that the
provisions of the Federal Power Act taken
individually did not provide. Given the
statute’s limitations for supplying such a
principle, the court should have moved more
carefully to limit the upheaval caused by its
holding and to allow FERC greater room to
maneuver in the face of technological change
in the energy sector.

156

Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
14-1146
Ruling Below: Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. Iowa 2014)
Peg Bouaphakeo and other named plaintiffs are employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. They represent a
class of employees at Tyson's meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. They sued Tyson
for not paying wages due under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq., and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL), Iowa Code 91A.1 et seq. A jury
returned a verdict for the class. Tyson appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this
court affirms.
Question Presented: (1) Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored
and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action
certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined
with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in
a sample. (2) Whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a
collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class
contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.

Peg BOUAPHAKEO; Javier Frayre; Jose A. Garcia; Mario Martinez; Jesus A. Montes;
Heribento Renteria, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs–Appellees
v.
TYSON FOODS, INC.,
Defendant–Appellant
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Decided on August 25, 2014
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON,
Circuit Judges.
I
The employees are current and former “gangtime” employees at Tyson's facility. The
background is similar to that in Lopez v.

Tyson Foods, Inc., (adapted to the facts of
this case):
To calculate the employees' compensable
working time, Tyson measures “gang
time”—when the employees are at their
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working stations and the production line is
moving. The employees claim Tyson failed
to provide FLSA overtime compensation for
donning (putting on) personal protective
equipment (PPE) and clothing before
production and again after lunch, and for
doffing (taking off) PPE and clothing before
lunch and again after production. The PPE
and clothing worn by individual employees
vary depending on their role in the process.
Tyson classifies items of PPE and clothing as
either “unique” or “non-unique” to the meatprocessing industry. The employees also seek
compensation for transporting the items from
lockers to the production floor.
In addition to “gang time,” Tyson adds “Kcode” time to each employee's paycheck.
Before 2007, Tyson paid four minutes of Kcode time per day to each [employee in a
department where knives were used] in order
to compensate for the donning and doffing of
unique items. From [February] 2007 to [June]
2010, Tyson added [several minutes] per day
for pre-and post-shift walking time required
of the employee․ Tyson does not record the
actual time that employees perform any of
these tasks.
The FLSA prohibits the employment of any
person “for a workweek longer than forty
hours unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess
of the hours above specified at a rate not less
than one and one-half times the regular rate
at which he is employed.” An employee who
sues for unpaid overtime “has the burden of
proving that he performed work for which he
was not properly compensated.” At one time,
the Supreme Court defined work as “physical
or mental exertion (whether burdensome or

not) controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the
benefit of the employer and his business.”
The Court then “clarified that ‘exertion’ was
not in fact necessary for an activity to
constitute ‘work’ under the FLSA.”
Whether an employee's activity is “work”
does not end the compensability analysis. In
the Portal–to–Portal Act, Congress excluded
some activities that might otherwise
constitute work from the FLSA. The Act
accepts two categories:
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to
and from the actual place of
performance of the principal activity
or activities which such employee is
employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to
or postliminary to said principal
activity or activities, which occur
either prior to the time on any
particular workday at which such
employee commences, or subsequent
to the time on any particular workday
at which he ceases, such principal
activity or activities.
The Department of Labor has a “continuous
workday rule,” generally defining an
employee's “workday” as “the period
between the commencement and completion
on the same workday of an employee's
principal activity or activities.” During the
continuous workday, the compensability of
all activities that otherwise satisfy the
requirements of the FLSA is not affected by
the Portal–to–Portal Act's exceptions. In
Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that “during
a continuous workday, any walking time that
occurs after the beginning of the employee's
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first principal activity and before the end of
the employee's last principal activity is
excluded from the scope of [the Portal–to–
Portal Act], and as a result is covered by the
FLSA.”
The employees sued in 2007, claiming that
Tyson's K-code time was insufficient to
cover compensable pre- and post-production
line activities, violating the FLSA and
IWPCL. The district court certified the FLSA
claim as a collective action and the IWPCL
claim as a Rule 23 class action. During a
nine-day trial, plaintiffs proved liability and
damages by using individual timesheets,
along with average donning, doffing, and
walking times calculated from 744 employee
observations. The jury returned a verdict for
the class of $2,892,378.70. With liquidated
damages, the final judgment totaled
$5,785,757.40.
II
Tyson argues that the district court erred in
certifying the FLSA collective action—under
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)—and the IWPCL class—
under Rule 23. Class certification is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. A district court may
certify a class under Rule 23(b) if “questions
of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members,” and “a class
action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” The FLSA allows named
plaintiffs to sue “for and in behalf of
themselves and other employees similarly
situated.” Plaintiffs may be similarly situated
when “they suffer from a single, FLSAviolating policy, and when proof of that

policy or of conduct in conformity with that
policy proves a violation as to all the
plaintiffs.” A court may consider “(1)
disparate factual and employment settings of
the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various
defenses available to defendant which appear
to be individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3)
fairness and procedural considerations.”
According to Tyson, factual differences
between plaintiffs-differences in PPE and
clothing between positions, the individual
routines of employees, and variation in duties
and management among departments-make
class
certification
improper.
These
differences, Tyson says, do not allow the
class action to “generate common answers
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Unlike
Dukes, Tyson had a specific company
policy—the payment of K-code time for
donning, doffing, and walking—that applied
to all class members. Unlike Dukes, class
members worked at the same plant and used
similar equipment. The time study showed
that donning and doffing all equipment, plus
walking, took an average of 18 minutes in the
fabrication department and 21 minutes in the
kill department. True, applying Tyson's Kcode policy and expert testimony to
“generate ․ answers” for individual overtime
claims did require inference, but this
inference is allowable under Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co. While individual
plaintiffs varied in their donning and doffing
routines, their complaint is not “dominated
by individual issues” such that “the varied
circumstances ․ prevent ‘one stroke’
determination.” The district court did not
abuse its discretion in certifying the class.
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Tyson also contends that the class should be
decertified because evidence at trial showed
that some class members did not work
overtime and would receive no FLSA
damages even if Tyson under-compensated
their donning, doffing, and walking. Tyson
exaggerates the authority for its contention.
At any rate, at Tyson's request, the jury was
instructed, “Any employee who has already
received full compensation for all activities
you may find to be compensable is not
entitled to recover any damages.” Tyson's
instruction directed the jury to treat plaintiffs
with no damages as class members. It is
“fundamental that where the defendant ․
‘invited error’ there can be no reversible
error.”
III.
Tyson believes that plaintiffs improperly
relied on a formula to prove liability. In
Dukes, the Supreme Court disapproved of
“Trial by Formula.”
A sample set of the class members would be
selected, as to whom liability for sex
discrimination and the back-pay owing as a
result would be determined in depositions
supervised by a master. The percentage of
claims determined to be valid would then be
applied to the entire remaining class, and the
number of (presumptively) valid claims thus
derived would be multiplied by the average
backpay award in the sample set to arrive at
the entire class recovery-without further
individualized proceedings.
Here, plaintiffs do not prove liability only for
a sample set of class members. They prove

liability for the class as a whole, using
employee time records to establish individual
damages. Using statistics or samples in
litigation is not necessarily trial by formula.
Plaintiffs do rely on inference from average
donning, doffing, and walking times, but they
apply this analysis to each class member
individually. Using this representative
evidence is comparable to a jury applying
testimony from named plaintiffs to find
classwide liability. For the donning, doffing,
and walking in Mt. Clemens, testimony from
eight employees established liability for 300
similarly situated workers. To prove
damages, the Court remanded for “the
determination of the amount of walking time
involved and the amount of preliminary
activities performed” based on “whatever
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the
employees' evidence.”
Tyson claims that plaintiffs presented
insufficient evidence to prove damages
classwide. This court “will not reverse a jury
verdict for insufficient evidence unless ‘after
viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, [it concludes] that no
reasonable juror could have returned a
verdict for the non-moving party.’” Tyson
has no evidence of the specific time each
class member spent donning, doffing, and
walking. “[W]hen an employer has failed to
keep proper records, courts should not
hesitate to award damages based on the ‘just
and reasonable inference’ from the evidence
presented.”
To prove damages, plaintiffs use individual
timesheets, along with average times
calculated from a sample of 744 observations
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of employee donning, doffing, and walking.
Plaintiffs' expert testified that the sample was
large for this type of study, representative,
and approximately random. He testified that
the study used “accepted procedure in
industrial engineering.” Tyson's Director of
Human Resources testified that K-code time
did not include the donning and doffing of
much non-unique PPE. Pay data—which
came directly from Tyson—showed the
amount of K-code time each individual
received. Sufficient evidence existed to
support a “reasonable inference” of classwide liability.
Tyson asserts that even if sufficient evidence
supported damages, plaintiffs' claims still fail
because it is uncertain if any uncompensated
work was performed, citing Carmody v.
Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners
only applies where the existence of damages
is certain․ Anderson allows uncertainty only
for the amount of damages.”). In Carmody,
the plaintiffs did not “produce[ ] evidence
indicating any hours worked over forty hours
per week ․ were never paid.” The plaintiffs
“did not provide any evidence of actual
damages because the testimony contained no
reference to overtime hours that violated the
FLSA.” Here, Tyson stipulates that “workers
at the Storm Lake plant tend to work a
significant amount of overtime on a weekly
basis.” Plaintiffs show uncompensated
overtime work by applying average donning,
doffing, and walking times to employee
timesheets. The evidence is “susceptible to
[the] reasonable inference” that the jury's
verdict is correct.
The judgment is affirmed.

BENTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
For two independent but somewhat factually
related reasons, this case should be reversed,
remanded and dismissed. First, under the
circumstances of this litigation, neither the
putative Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
collective action (the so-called federal class)
nor the purported Iowa Wage Payment
Collection Law (IWPCL) Rule 23(b)(3) class
(the so-called state class) were eligible for
class certification, either as a matter of fact or
a matter of law. Second, Rule 23 state-lawbased class actions are fundamentally
different than collective actions authorized
under the FLSA and may not be procedurally
homogenized for trial as done in this case.
I. BACKGROUND
This litigation generally involves hourly
production employees of Tyson Foods at its
Storm Lake, Iowa, meat-processing facility.
But, the dispute more basically involves six
named (lead) plaintiff employees from the
kill, cut and retrim departments of the Storm
Lake operation who were paid their wages
using, in part, Tyson's “gang-time”
compensation system but who also claim to
have been owed overtime pay resulting from
disparate compensable work activities
occurring at times other than while earning
daily “gang time” kill, cut and retrim
department production line compensation.
The six attempt to assert two separate
collective actions-a federal statutory action
asserting violations of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–219, and a state statutory action
separately based upon the IWPCL, Iowa
Code Chapter 91A.
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This case was originally assigned to the
Honorable Mark Bennett who conditionally
“certified” a federal collective action class
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and a
purported IWPCL state law class pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
Then, because the Honorable John Jarvey
was already assigned to several comparable
cases involving Tyson, this matter was
transferred to Judge Jarvey for further pretrial
and post-trial proceedings and for trial. The
case has now been litigated and is before this
panel on appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Federal FLSA Class
A collective action to recover damages
permitted by the FLSA “may be maintained
against any employer ․ in any Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction by
anyone or more employees for and in behalf
of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated.” However,
“[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to
any such action unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.”
The six named lead plaintiff employees who
sought to establish this collective action bore
the “burden of showing that the opt-in
[consenting] plaintiffs are similarly situated
to the lead plaintiffs.” Judge Bennett,
apparently recognizing the likely existence of
numerous factors unrelated to the “gangtime” pay used to determine a given Tyson
employee's regular wages-factors amply
established by the evidence at trial-certified a

“conditional” FLSA class consisting of
employees from the kill, cut and retrim
departments at the Tyson plant paid through
the so-called gang-time compensation system
within a discrete time period set forth in the
certification. Indeed, the conditional
certification related only to the three
departments and the gang-time pay earned in
the production line in those departments. No
other regular or overtime pay calculation
factors discussed at the merits portion of the
trial (such as: individual employment codes,
specific duties, wage-rate variations, knife
wielding protections, sanitary clothing and
equipment, part-time work, illness, injury,
shift differentials, and routine production line
overtime) were in any way incorporated as
limitations on the use of the FLSA
conditional class. The record reveals that this
“conditional” designation was never
withdrawn or modified at any time during or
after the trial. According to the joint
stipulation of facts by the parties, there were
444 employees who consented to be a part of
this FLSA collective action class including
the six named lead plaintiffs.
B. The IWPCL State Class
“‘In order to obtain class certification, a
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
class should be certified and that the
requirements of Rule 23 are met.’” Judge
Bennett, at the request of the same six named
plaintiffs who sought creation of and joined
the FLSA collective class, ultimately
certified what he termed a “modified” 3,344–
person putative Rule 23 state law class
consisting of all “current and former
employees of Tyson's Storm Lake, Iowa,
processing facility who have been employed
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at any time from February 7, 2005, to the
present, and who are or were paid under a
‘gang-time’ compensation system in the Kill,
Cut or Retrim departments.” This
certification also included no other limiting
or enhancing overtime pay calculation
elements. The record discloses that this
certification was likewise never further
embellished or modified during or after trial.
The “gang-time system of payment” as
referred to by Judge Bennett and defined by
the evidence is a system where employees are
paid from the time their production line starts
to the time their production line ends. There
is no contention by the named plaintiffs that
the Storm Lake Tyson employees did not
receive all wages due and owing for time
worked during the production line gang-time
pay periods. So, standing by itself, as it does
in the class certifications, the gang-time
production line classification means little in
the context of proving at trial through
evidence common to the class the overtime
pay claims of the 3,344 members of the
allegedly underpaid overtime class. Supreme
Court and Eighth Circuit precedent demands
otherwise.
To be certified for purposes of Rule 23(a), the
collective groupings, that is the putative
classes, must have been such that Tyson was
positioned to assert its legitimately held
common-to-the-class defenses against all
members of the group who claimed to have
earned unpaid overtime wages. In this same
context, the class must have been limited to
Tyson employees who could and did
establish entitlement to overtime pay
resulting from overtime work performed
during compensable time, that is, work

performed at times other than production line
gang-time pay periods-periods for which all
class members were already routinely,
regularly, and unquestionably paid by Tyson
in accordance with the law.
“In order to obtain class certification, a
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
class should be certified and that the
requirements of Rule 23 are met.” While a
Rule 23(b)(3) class was purportedly certified,
any Rule 23 class may only be lawfully
certified if the “trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Actual, not
presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a)
remains indispensable. Frequently, as in this
case, “ ‘rigorous analysis' will entail some
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's
underlying claim.” Rule 23(a)'s four bedrock
requirements are numerosity, commonality,
typicality and adequate representation (here,
a named plaintiff with standing).
Commonality requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate at the time of the merits hearing
on the underlying claim-that all class
members suffered the same injury. So, if the
locution “injury” includes the measure of a
class member's individual damages, as I
believe it does, this class fails on that score
alone.
The court majority apparently sees a pathway
around plaintiffs' legal dilemma arising from
the above-noted class formulation failures.
Although
acknowledging
that
class
certification is improper when a “windfall” is
conferred on some class members, ante at 7,
the court makes the following observation:
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At any rate, at Tyson's request, the jury was
instructed, “Any employee who has already
received full compensation for all activities
you may find to be compensable is not
entitled to recover any damages.” Tyson's
instruction directed the jury to treat plaintiffs
with no damages as class members. It is
“fundamental that where the defendant ․
‘invited error’ there can be no reversible
error.”
Thus, says the court, Tyson “directed the jury
to treat plaintiffs with no damages as class
members.” However, Tyson made no such
class membership directive to the jury
through its instructional request and Beason
and Steele are wholly inapposite as case
precedent for the court's faulty premise. The
cases deal only with run-of-the-mill
evidentiary matters, not waivers of legal
principles. Beason simply opened the door to
the making of a Bruton exception by
permitting an admission from a nontestifying co-defendant, and Steele admitted
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to
clarify and rebut an issue opened by the
criminal defendant's cross-examination.
Tyson, after vigorously resisting class action
formulations at every turn in this litigation,
and being denied, properly requested an
instruction that the plaintiffs be held to their
evidentiary burdens of proof.
C. The Merits
Fundamentally, as previously noted, this case
emerges from two separate causes of action
brought through a single federal court
complaint—a federal law cause of action
alleging liability leading to damages arising
from violation of the FLSA and a state law

cause of action alleging liability and damages
arising from violation of the IWPCL. The
burden of proof on all issues of statutory
liability, injury and measure of damages rests
squarely upon the shoulders of the named
plaintiffs. In this case, gang-time pay is not in
dispute. The plaintiffs contend, as does the
court majority, that the overtime pay dispute
involves time spent by a class of Tyson
employees in doffing and donning various
sanitary and personal protection equipment
before and after the gang-time production
line work has been completed each day.
Tyson's Storm Lake employees are required
to wear a different combination of sanitary
and protective gear. Those employees
wearing knives to use in conjunction with
their particular duties on a particular day are
required to wear a combination of a plastic
belly guard, mesh apron, mesh sleeve,
plexiglass arm guard, mesh glove, Polar
glove, membrane skinner gloves, Polar
sleeves, “steel” for maintaining the knives
and knife scabbards (“knife related gear”).
Other workers are required to wear a hard hat,
hairnet, beard net, earplugs, ear muffs, rubber
or cotton gloves, and rubber or plastic aprons
(“sanitary gear”).
From 1998 until February 4, 2007, Tyson
paid four extra minutes beyond production
line time for all production employees,
referred to as “K–Code” time. From February
4, 2007, to June 28, 2010, Tyson ceased
paying non-knife-wielding employees for the
time donning and doffing sanitary gear. From
February 4, 2007, to June 28, 2010, Tyson
paid knife-wielding employees between 4 to
8 minutes of KCode time, depending on the
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job, and employees who did not have a knife
did not receive K–Code time payments.
Plaintiffs offered evidence at trial concerning
a sample of putative class employees from
Dr. Kenneth Mericle and Dr. Liesl Fox. Fox's
calculation testimony fed off of Mericle's
evidence concerning Rule 23 class damages
for overtime pay. Fox testified, assuming
Mericle's evidence was true, that at least 212
members of the purported class did not suffer
any damages because the doffing and
donning time, less the K–Code time “would
not have been enough to kick them into
overtime.” Further, while the plaintiffs'
evidence generally indicated some individual
overtime damages ranging from a few cents
to several thousand dollars, there were at least
509 workers whose injuries ranged from
$0.27 to less than $100. And, the record
discloses that the jury in returning only a
single gross amount of damages verdict, as
instructed, discounted plaintiffs' evidence by
more than half, likely indicating that more
than half of the putative class suffered either
no damages or only a de minimis injury
measured in cents rather than dollars. In spite
of having the burden of proof, there was no
evidence adduced by plaintiffs that
established the number of purported class
member employees fully compensated or not
fully compensated by the K–Code payments
already paid by Tyson. It is evident, however,
that many class employees fit within each
category and all were apparently included as
beneficiaries of the single damages verdict
returned by the jury.
Rule 23(a)(2) contemplates that “there are
questions of law or fact common to the
class.” “Commonality requires the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the class members have
suffered the same injury. This does not mean
merely that they have all suffered a violation
of the same provision of law.” Rather,
“[t]heir claims must depend upon a common
contention. That common contention,
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is
capable of class-wide resolution-which
means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.” “What matters to class certification
is not the raising of common ‘questions' ․
but, rather the capacity of a class-wide
proceeding to generate common answers apt
to drive the resolution of the litigation.” That
was not the case here. While it is true that all
class members were subject to a common
policy-gang-time payment-there is no
“common answer,” arising from the evidence
concerning the individual overtime pay
questions at issue in this case. Thus, this case
with these classes cannot be resolved in “one
stroke,” given the differences in donning and
doffing
times,
K–Code
payments,
abbreviated gang time shifts, absenteeism,
sickness, vacation and a myriad of other
relevant factors. The “rigorous” analysis of
class certification in this case, which overlaps
with the merits as required by Dukes, clearly
discloses that the Rule 23 class claim does not
comply with either rule or precedent and
should have been decertified.
Finally, the wisdom of the Supreme Court's
statement in Symczyk, that Rule 23 class
actions and collective actions under the
FLSA are fundamentally different and thus
do not lend themselves to inextricably
intertwined trials, as here, is well dramatized
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by this case. Here we have undifferentiated
presentations of evidence, including
significant numbers of the putative classes
suffering no injury and members of the entire
classes suffering wide variations in damages,
ultimately resulting in a single-sum classwide verdict from which each purported class
member, damaged or not, will receive a prorata portion of the jury's one-figure verdict.
Assuming that the district court could now reopen the proceedings in an effort to deal with

an individual plaintiff's damages using the
Mericle/Fox evidence, the exercise would be
laborious, virtually unguided, and well
outside of the limiting parameters the
Supreme Court has, as a matter of law, placed
upon use of the Rule 23 class action
machinery.
III. CONCLUSION
From this result, I dissent.
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“High Court Told to Kill Tyson Workers’ $5.8M Don-Doff Award”
Law360
Kurt Orzeck
March 27, 2015
Tyson Foods Inc. wants the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn a $5.8 million judgment
awarded to a class of employees in a
compensation dispute over time spent putting
on and taking off protective gear, according
to a court filing made public Friday.
In a petition for writ of certiorari, Tyson
argued a district court shouldn’t have
certified the class due to differences in the
amount of time that employees spent on
donning and doffing protective gear. The
workers alleged that Tyson's so-called gangtime compensation system short-changed
them on pay.
In August, a divided Eighth Circuit panel
upheld a decision by U.S. District Judge John
A. Jarvey that affirmed a jury verdict
favoring the workers, saying he properly
certified their claims under both the Fair
Labor Standards Act and Iowa state law. In
November, a divided Eighth Circuit declined
Tyson’s rehearing bid.
Tyson argued in its Supreme Court petition,
filed Mar. 19, that other circuit courts have
held that a class can’t be certified if plaintiffs
try to get an aggregate damages award by
extrapolating from an allegedly fictional
“average” class member.
“This court’s review is also needed to resolve
the confusion among the lower courts on the
question of whether a class may be certified

when it includes uninjured class members,”
Tyson said, adding that hundreds of
employees in the suit allegedly didn’t work
any overtime at all due to donning and
doffing. “This court should grant review to
resolve the confusion and put an end to this
unlawful practice.”
The petition is the latest move in a suit that
traces back to 2007, when workers at Tyson's
meat-processing facility in Storm Lake,
Iowa, claimed Tyson's policy didn't fully
compensate them for pre- and postproduction line activities, according to court
documents.
In September 2011, an Iowa jury found that
the plaintiffs had proven that the time they
spent donning and doffing hard hats, work
boots, hairnets, aprons, gloves and earplugs
constituted an indispensable part of their
work at Tyson plants. The verdict awarded
the workers $2.9 million, and a subsequent
ruling on liquidated damages upped the total
final judgment to $5.8 million, according to
court documents.
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
2011 ruling in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes,
Tyson argued on appeal that alleged
differences in the donning and doffing times
didn’t allow the class action to "generate
common answers apt to drive the resolution
of the litigation," according to court
documents.
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But the Eighth Circuit disagreed in August,
saying that unlike Dukes, Tyson had a
specific company policy that applied to all
class members. Also in contrast to Dukes, the
class members in the instant case worked at
the same plant and used similar equipment,
the panel said.
Though a majority of Eighth Circuit judges
denied Tyson's rehearing request in
November, six judges on the circuit said they
would have granted a rehearing en banc or a
panel rehearing.
Tyson argued in its Supreme Court petition
that three production workers who testified at
trial said they spent different amounts of time
on donning- and doffing-related activities. A
study showed a wide variation among the
times, with employees spending between

about a half-minute and 13 minutes donning
equipment in the locker room pre-shift and
between roughly two and nine minutes
doffing and storing equipment post-shift,
according to Tyson.
A Tyson spokesman told Law360 on Friday
that the company was initially involved in
this case because federal wage and hour laws
are not precise in determining how to
compensate certain activities.
"We’re now addressing another aspect of the
case: whether there’s enough evidence for it
to be considered a class action," he said.
"Since even the federal courts of appeal are
divided over what employees qualify to be
part of such class action cases, we’ve asked
the U.S. Supreme Court to get involved.
We’re hopeful our request will be granted."
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“Roberts Court to Review Wage Theft Class Action Case”
RH Reality Check
Jessica Mason Pieklo
June 8, 2015
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
consider new limits on workers’ ability to
collectively challenge pay and workplace
issues under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).
The Roberts Court granted review in the case
of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, a class action
lawsuit against Tyson Foods Inc. over the pay
of more than 3,000 employees at its Storm
Lake, Iowa, pork processing plant. Peg
Bouaphakeo, along with other Tyson
employees challenged a series of practices,
including Tyson’s refusal to provide
overtime compensation for the time
employees spent “donning (putting on)
personal protective equipment (PPE)” and
clothing before and again after lunch, and for
doffing (removing) PPE and clothing before
and after lunch.
The employees sued Tyson for failing to pay
wages under the FLSA and Iowa Wage
Payment Collection Law. A jury returned a
verdict for the certified class of workers,
ordering Tyson to pay $5.8 million in past
wages and damages.
A federal appeals court affirmed the
multimillion-dollar verdict against Tyson.
The Roberts Court on Monday agreed to step
in and hear Tyson’s arguments that it should
only have to defend against claims by
workers who were injured by Tyson’s wage-

and-hour violations, and not the entire
certified class of workers in the lawsuit.
In other words, Tyson is not defending its
actual labor practices but instead arguing the
courts made a procedural error by allowing
Bouaphakeo’s lawsuit to have been certified
as a class action.
To support their petition for review to the
Roberts Court, Tyson and other industry
groups rely on the Roberts Court decision in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, a 2011 decision that
revoked class action certification from what
would have been one of the largest gender
bias lawsuits of its kind. That decision
significantly curtailed the scope of potential
class action lawsuits under federal
employment laws.
Industry groups hope to have similar success
curtailing workers’ rights to bring class
action lawsuits under the FSLA in
Bouaphekeo.
A decision in favor of Tyson could have a
wide-reaching
effect.
Like
pay
discrimination
cases,
wage-and-hour
lawsuits often involve individual damages
claims that may not amount to a lot of money
compared to the time and expense involved
in prosecuting those claims. Class action
lawsuits in which workers can aggregate their
claims and money damages, however, give
workers leverage in fighting against wage
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theft as the aggregated damages can add up
to multimillion-dollar verdicts, as it did
against Tyson in Bouaphakeo.
Monday’s decision to review the classcertification in Bouaphakeo may not be the
only FLSA class action case the Roberts
Court will hear next term.
The Court considered Bouaphakeo along
with two other petitions, both filed by

Walmart, challenging FLSA class action
verdicts in Pennsylvania totaling more than
$187 million. Despite considering the cases
together, the Roberts Court on Monday took
no action on the Walmart cases challenging
class action certifications under the FLSA,
which means the Court could be waiting to
see how the arguments in Bouaphakeo unfold
before deciding how broadly to review class
action certification in wage theft claims.
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“Game Changer?”
Seyfarth Shaw LLP
Richard Alfred, Patrick Bannon, and Esther Slater McDonald
June 9, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
hear an appeal challenging a nearly $6.0
million judgment in a collective and class
action case against Tyson Foods, Inc. In
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, a wage and
hour collective and class action regarding the
compensability of time spent donning and
doffing, the Court will decide (1) whether
liability and damages may be determined by
statistical techniques that presume all class or
collective members are similar; and (2)
whether a class or collective action may
include individuals who were not injured.
Case Background
Plaintiff employees brought a collective and
class action against Tyson under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and a parallel
state law. The plaintiffs alleged that they
were entitled to damages because Tyson
failed to pay them overtime for time spent
“donning” and “doffing” personal protective
equipment and walking to and from their
work stations. The district court certified an
FLSA collective and Rule 23 class based on
its conclusions regarding the existence of
common questions about whether those
activities were “compensable ‘work’” under
the FLSA and the state law. At trial, the
plaintiffs used statistical evidence of the
average donning, doffing, and walking times
for employees to prove liability and damages.
The jury returned a verdict for the collective

and class, and the final judgment totaled $5.8
million.
On appeal, Tyson contended that certification
was improper because employees’ individual
routines varied and, thus, the litigation could
not generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation as required under
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011). Tyson pointed out that liability
and damages were only inferred as to
individual class members based on statistical
evidence contrary to the Supreme Court’s
“Trial by Formula” prohibition in Dukes and
the use of damages models that ignore the
basis of defendant’s alleged liability to each
class member as required by Comcast v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
Tyson further argued that collective and class
certification was inappropriate because some
class members did not work any overtime and
were thus not entitled to any damages. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
these arguments, holding that liability and
damages could be proven by inference and
that issues relating to individual damages, or
no damages at all, do not preclude
certification.
Citing circuit splits on both issues presented,
Tyson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
in March 2015 which was granted today.
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Those issues, as stated in the cert petition,
are:
(1) Whether differences among individual
class members may be ignored and a class
action certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action
certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
where liability and damages will be
determined with statistical techniques that
presume all class members are identical to the
average observed in a sample; and
(2) whether a class action may be certified or
maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a
collective action certified or maintained
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the
class contains hundreds of members who
were not injured and have no legal right to
any damages.
Potential Implications for Wage & Hour
Collective and Class Actions
Even though employers have been facing an
avalanche of wage and hour collective and
class claims for more than a decade, the
Supreme Court has had little to say in the
wage and hour context about the procedures
for litigating collective actions, class actions,
or “hybrids” of the two. The potential for a
game-changing ruling is a very important
development for employers.

Courts have been divided about whether the
mere allegation of a specific type of FLSA
violation, allegedly affecting a group of
employees, is sufficient to show that the
employees are “similarly situated” within the
meaning of Section 216(b), the main
remedies provision of the FLSA. The issue
that the Supreme Court has now agreed to
hear–whether a collective can properly be
certified where the alleged FLSA violation
affected different employees differently and
some not at all–is an important one,
especially in “off-the-clock” FLSA cases.
The Tyson Foods case is especially
fascinating because it involves a “hybrid”
case, involving a Rule 23 opt-out class with
several thousand members and an FLSA
“collective” of 444 opt-in plaintiffs. The
Supreme Court can be expected to address
how its Wal-Mart and Comcast decisions–
both arising under Rule 23–apply to FLSA
collective actions as well as state law wage
and hour class actions. The Court’s
prohibition in Wal-Mart of “trial by formula”
has the potential to restrict the certification of
collective actions, both initially and
ultimately, to adjudicate cases with large
numbers of plaintiffs with highly
individualized claims.
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DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia
14-462
Ruling Below: Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 4th 338 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2014)
Plaintiff customer filed a class action complaint against defendant television service provider
under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., and other state
laws, and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, denied the provider's motion to
compel arbitration. The provider appealed.
The court of appeal held that the trial court properly denied the provider's motion to compel
arbitration. The arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it expressly stated that the
entire section would be unenforceable if the law of the customer's state would find the class
action waiver unenforceable. California would have found the waiver unenforceable because
CLRA expressly precludes waiver of the right to bring a CLRA class action. The reference to
state law regarding enforceability of the class action waiver created a specific exception to the
general provision that the arbitration agreement would be governed by the FAA and did not
render that general provision meaningless. (Credit Lexis Nexis)
Question Presented: Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict
with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act.

Amy IMBURGIA et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
v.
DIRECTV, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One
Filed on April 7, 2014
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
APPEAL from an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County. John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
DIRECTV, Inc. moved to dismiss or stay this
class action litigation and to compel

arbitration. The superior court denied the
motion. DIRECTV argues that the motion
should have been granted under the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011). We
conclude that under the terms of the parties’
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arbitration agreement, the motion was
correctly denied. We therefore affirm.

waivers in consumer contracts are
unconscionable and hence unenforceable.

BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2011, less than one month after
the Court decided Concepcion, DIRECTV
moved to stay or dismiss plaintiffs’ action,
decertify the class, and compel arbitration of
plaintiffs’ claims. DIRECTV explained that
it had not moved to compel arbitration earlier
because, in an unrelated case several years
before plaintiffs filed this litigation, the Court
of Appeal had held that the arbitration
provision
in
DIRECTV’s
customer
agreement was unenforceable under
Discover Bank. Until Concepcion held that
the FAA preempts the rule of Discover Bank,
DIRECTV consequently believed that a
motion to compel arbitration would be futile.

On September 17, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed
a class action complaint against DIRECTV,
alleging claims for unjust enrichment,
declaratory relief, false advertising, and
violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act (CLRA), the unfair competition law
(UCL), and Civil Code section 1671,
subdivision (d). Imburgia’s claims were
based on allegations that DIRECTV has
improperly charged early termination fees to
its customers. Kathy Greiner filed a similar
class action complaint one day after
Imburgia, and Imburgia and Greiner
(hereafter plaintiffs) jointly filed a first
amended complaint on March 16, 2009.
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit proceeded at the same time
as a multidistrict litigation proceeding in
federal court involving similar claims.
DIRECTV moved to stay plaintiffs’ state
court action pending the outcome of the
multidistrict litigation, but the superior court
denied the motion.
Plaintiffs subsequently moved for class
certification. On April 20, 2011, the superior
court granted the motion in part and denied it
in part, certifying a class as to one of
plaintiffs’ theories but denying certification
as to others.
On April 27, 2011, the United States
Supreme Court decided Concepcion, which
held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
preempts the rule of Discover Bank v.
Superior Court (2005). Discover Bank held
that under certain circumstances, class action

The relevant arbitration provision is
contained in section 9 of DIRECTV’s 2007
customer agreement. Section 9 provides that
“any legal or equitable claim relating to this
Agreement, any addendum, or your Service”
will first be addressed through an informal
process and, if the claim is not resolved
informally, then “any Claim either of us
asserts will be resolved only by binding
arbitration” under JAMS rules. Under the
heading “Special Rules,” section 9 of the
agreement provides as follows: “Neither you
nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate
claims in arbitration by or against other
individuals or entities, or arbitrate any claim
as a representative member of a class or in a
private
attorney
general
capacity.
Accordingly, you and we agree that the
JAMS Class Action Procedures do not apply
to our arbitration. If, however, the law of your
state would find this agreement to dispense
with
class
arbitration
procedures
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unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is
unenforceable.”
Section 10 of the 2007 customer agreement
contains provisions addressing several
miscellaneous matters, including the
following provision concerning “Applicable
Law”: “The interpretation and enforcement
of this Agreement shall be governed by the
rules and regulations of the Federal
Communications
Commission,
other
applicable federal laws, and the laws of the
state and local area where Service is provided
to you. This Agreement is subject to
modification if required by such laws.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act.”
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel
arbitration on numerous grounds. The
superior court denied the motion, and
DIRECTV timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“On appeal from the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration, ‘we review the arbitration
agreement de novo to determine whether it is
legally enforceable, applying general
principles of California contract law. We
review the superior court’s ruling, not its
reasoning, and we consequently may affirm
on the basis of any valid legal theory,
regardless of whether the superior court
relied on it.
DISCUSSION
In addition to stating that the parties waive
their rights to bring class claims, section 9 of
the 2007 customer agreement states that if
“the law of your state would find this

agreement to dispense with class arbitration
procedures unenforceable, then this entire
Section 9 is unenforceable.” Plaintiffs argue
that the law of California would find the class
action waiver unenforceable because, for
example, the CLRA expressly precludes
waiver of the right to bring a class action
under the CLRA. Plaintiffs conclude that the
parties’ entire arbitration agreement is
unenforceable, pursuant to the agreement’s
express terms, because the law of plaintiffs’
state would find the class action waiver
unenforceable. We agree.
As all parties point out, the FAA “requires
courts to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts,
in accordance with their terms.” The FAA’s
broad policy of enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms applies
even to “agreements to arbitrate under
different rules than those set forth in the
[FAA] itself.” Thus, if “parties have agreed
to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms
of the agreement is fully consistent with the
goals of the FAA,” even if application of the
state rules would yield a different result from
application of the FAA. Consequently,
although it is impossible for parties to “‘opt
out’ of FAA coverage in its entirety because
it is the FAA itself that authorizes parties to
choose different rules in the first place,” it is
in other respects permissible for the parties to
“opt out of the FAA’s default rules.” In
particular, a choice of law provision in an
arbitration agreement is, in general,
enforceable to the same extent as a choice of
law provision in any other contract. We have
previously held that the parties to a contract
may choose the law under which the
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enforceability of a class action waiver is to be
determined.
Under the foregoing principles, if section 9 of
DIRECTV’s 2007 customer agreement had
said that the enforceability of the class action
waiver “shall be determined under the law of
your state to the extent that it is not
preempted by the FAA,” then that provision
would have been enforceable. Likewise, if
section 9 had said that the enforceability of
the class action waiver “shall be determined
under the law of your state without
considering the preemptive effect, if any, of
the FAA,” then that provision would have
been enforceable as well. No party argues to
the contrary.
Section 9 of the 2007 customer agreement is
not, however, as explicit as either of those
hypothetical examples. The question before
us, then, is how to interpret section 9’s choice
of law concerning enforceability of the class
action waiver. Where section 9 requires us to
consider whether “the law of your state
would find this agreement to dispense with
class arbitration procedures unenforceable,”
does it mean “the law of your state to the
extent it is not preempted by the FAA,” or
“the law of your state without considering the
preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA”?
Plaintiffs argue that it means the latter, and
we agree.
Plaintiffs’ principal argument in favor of
their interpretation is that “under well
established
principles
of
contract
interpretation, when a general and a
particular provision are inconsistent, the
particular and specific provision is
para[]mount to the general provision.” On
that basis, plaintiffs contend that the

reference to “the law of your state” in section
9 of the 2007 customer agreement operates as
“a specific exception to the arbitration
agreement’s general adoption of the FAA” in
section 10. That is, although the agreement
provides that in general section 9 is governed
by the FAA, section 9 itself provides that the
specific issue of the enforceability of the
class action waiver shall be governed by “the
law of your state.”
DIRECTV’s sole response to that argument
is that “the contract interpretation principle
[p]laintiffs invoke applies only where ‘the
provisions
in
question
are
truly
inconsistent,’”
but
“there
is
no
inconsistency” here because “both federal
and state law have a role.” We are not
persuaded. If we apply state law alone (for
example, the antiwaiver provision of the
CLRA) to the class action waiver, then the
waiver is unenforceable. If we apply federal
law, then the class action waiver is
enforceable and any state law to the contrary
is preempted. That is a sufficient
inconsistency to make plaintiffs’ principle of
contract interpretation applicable. Indeed, the
entire preemption analysis of Concepcion is
based on a conflict or inconsistency between
the Discover Bank rule and the FAA.
Our interpretation of the contract finds
further support in “the common-law rule of
contract interpretation that a court should
construe ambiguous language against the
interest of the party that drafted it.”
DIRECTV “drafted an ambiguous document,
and [it] cannot now claim the benefit of the
doubt. The reason for this rule is to protect
the party who did not choose the language
from an unintended or unfair result.”
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Moreover, “[t]hat rationale is well suited to
the facts of this case” because “[a]s a
practical matter, it seems unlikely that”
plaintiffs anticipated in 2007 that the
Supreme Court would hold in 2011 that the
FAA preempts the Discover Bank rule
concerning the enforceability of class action
waivers in arbitration agreements. “In the
face of such doubt, we are unwilling to
impute this intent to [plaintiffs].”
Finally, DIRECTV cites three cases as
having “rejected” plaintiffs’ argument. Two
of the cases are readily distinguishable
because, unlike the instant case, neither of
them involves an arbitration agreement that
specifically provides that the enforceability
of the class action waiver is to be decided
under state law.
The third case, however, is a decision in the
federal multidistrict litigation that parallels
the instant state court actions. In an
“[i]ndicative [r]uling” under rule 62.1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal
district court stated that the reference to “the
law of your state” in section 9 of the customer
agreement could not mean that enforceability
of the class action waiver should be
determined exclusively under state law,
because that would render “meaningless”
section 10’s general statement that the
arbitration agreement is governed by the
FAA. We disagree. The specific reference to
state law concerning the enforceability of the
class action waiver creates a narrow and
specific exception to the general provision
that the arbitration agreement will be
governed by the FAA. It does not render that
general provision meaningless. In addition,
the district court’s analysis does not address

the principles that a specific provision
controls over a general one and that
ambiguous language is construed against the
interest of the drafter. For all of these reasons,
we decline to follow the district court’s
decision.
After briefing in this appeal was completed,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided a similar case
concerning the enforceability of the
arbitration provision and class action waiver
in DIRECTV’s customer agreement under
Concepcion. The court held that “the
arbitration agreement is enforceable under
Concepcion,” which preempts any state law
to the contrary. The court reasoned that “the
parties’ various contract interpretation
arguments”—which included both the
argument that the specific reference to state
law controlled over the general reference to
the FAA and the argument that ambiguities
should be construed against the drafter—“are
largely irrelevant to our analysis,” because
under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, and the related doctrine
of federal preemption, federal law is the law
of every state.
We find the analysis in Murphy unpersuasive.
On the one hand, insofar as the court’s
reasoning is a matter of contract
interpretation, it means that when the parties
used the phrase “the law of your state,” they
meant “federal law plus (nonfederal) state
law.” Murphy provides no basis for
concluding that the parties intended to use the
phrase “the law of your state” in such a way,
and we are aware of none. On the contrary, a
reasonable reader of the customer agreement
would naturally interpret the phrase “the law
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of your state” as referring to (nonfederal)
state law, and any ambiguity should be
construed against the drafter. On the other
hand, insofar as the court reasoned that
contract interpretation is irrelevant because
the parties are powerless to opt out of the
FAA by contract, we are aware of no
authority for the court’s position. Rather, as
we have already observed, if the customer
agreement expressly provided that the
enforceability of the class action waiver
“shall be determined under the (nonfederal)
law of your state without considering the
preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA,” then
that choice of law would be enforceable;
Murphy cites no authority to the contrary.
Consequently, the dispositive issue is
whether the parties intended to make that

choice. As a result, “the parties’ various
contract interpretation arguments” are not
“largely irrelevant.”
To summarize: Section 9 of the 2007
customer agreement provides that “if . . . the
law of your state would find this agreement
to dispense with class arbitration procedures
unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is
unenforceable.” The class action waiver is
unenforceable under California law, so the
entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable.
The superior court therefore properly denied
the motion to compel arbitration.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents shall
recover their costs of appeal.
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“U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear DirecTV Arbitration Case”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
March 23, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to hear an appeal filed by DirecTV Inc
concerning the satellite television provider's
efforts to enforce arbitration agreements its
customers in California have signed.
The high court agreed to review a decision by
a state appeals court in California that found
that consumers were not bound by a
provision in the company's customer
agreement preventing disputes being
resolved on a class-wide basis.
The company says that disagreements must
be resolved individually via private
arbitration.
Consumer advocates have criticized the
increased use of arbitration agreements that

they say deny customers the opportunity to
vindicate their rights in court.
The litigation dates back to 2008 when Amy
Imburgia and Kathy Grenier filed class action
lawsuits saying that DirecTV had violated
state law by imposing cancellation fees.
DirecTV says the April 2014 ruling by the
California Court of Appeal, Second District
in favor of the consumers conflicts with a
2013 decision the company won on the same
matter that was issued by the San Franciscobased 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The high court will hear the case during its
next term, which starts in October and ends
in June 2016.
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“Direct to Arbitration: Enforcing Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts”
JLPP: Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Wayne Yu
April 12, 2015
The Supreme Court has agreed to review a
class action lawsuit brought by consumers
challenging DirecTV’s early termination
fees. At issue is whether DirecTV’s customer
agreements, which require consumer disputes
to be settled through private arbitration as
opposed to litigation, are enforceable.
Most recently, the Second District California
Court of Appeals ruled against DirecTV,
finding that consumers were “not bound” by
DirecTV’s contract provision forcing
disputes to be settled through private
arbitration rather than litigation. In upholding
the decision, the California Supreme Court
denied review, stating that “California law
forbids arbitration agreements that include a
class action waiver.” DirecTV petitioned for
a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state law,
and therefore company contracts barring
class action lawsuits are enforceable.
DirecTV, and many businesses, favor
arbitration because the process generally
lowers litigation costs, and more efficiently
resolves customer disputes. Unlike litigation,
the arbitration process is much quicker,
permitting companies to spend “less time
fighting, and more time actually running their
businesses.”
Arbitration is also less adversarial than
litigation. This assists in resolving disputes

while preserving ongoing customer and
business relationships. One of the most
compelling advantages of arbitration is the
ability to keep both disputes and resolutions
private. Arbitration proceedings are usually
private, and parties generally agree to keep
both the proceedings and terms of the
resolution
confidential.
Accordingly,
companies attain invaluable benefits through
arbitration
if
a
dispute
concerns
commercially sensitive and/or embarrassing
matters.
Consumers claim that the increased use of
arbitration denies individuals their rightful
opportunity to vindicate their claims in court.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys assert that because
arbitration occurs “behind closed doors,”
arbitration is stacked in favor of the
companies. Unlike a judge in the courtroom,
an arbiter’s final decision is neither
constrained nor guided by law, statutes, or
precedent. As a result, both the lack of
transparency and public accessibility of
arbitration proceedings and resolutions may
undermine the credibility and integrity of the
process, and any final decisions of a
presumed “objective” arbiter. Furthermore,
unlike arbitration, litigation encourages and
permits extensive discovery and full
disclosure of evidence to all parties involved
in a dispute.
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Perhaps, the most important difference
between litigation and arbitration is the right
to appeal. In arbitration, the arbitrator’s
decision is generally not subject to review.
Accordingly, consumers disapprove of
arbitration because they believe that
“mistakes are made frequently,” and that the
right to request a “second look” is both vital
and important. The process of litigation
preserves such rights through the appeals
process.

Given the pros and cons of either arbitration
or litigation, it is unclear which process is
better for settling disputes and reaching
resolutions. However, the Supreme Court
will determine whether arbitration clauses
barring class action lawsuits are enforceable,
when it hears DirecTV Inc. v. Amy Imburgia,
et al. this fall. This determination should
hopefully settle the dispute once and for all.
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“Recent California Appellate Opinion Raises Issue of Concepcion’s
Scope”
National Law Review
May 2, 2014
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011), cleared the way for
consumer products companies and other
businesses to incorporate class action waivers
into their arbitration agreements with
customers. On April 7, 2014, the Second
District Court of Appeal in California
affirmed the denial of a motion to compel
arbitration despite Concepcion, relying on
language in the arbitration clause that
rendered the clause invalid if state law would
find the class action waiver unenforceable.
The decision appears to contradict a recent
Ninth Circuit decision, calling into question
Concepcion’s scope and ensuring further
litigation of the issue.
In Imburgia v. DirecTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr.
3d 190 (2014), Plaintiffs accused DirecTV of
improperly charging early termination fees
and brought a class action against the
company for false advertising, violation of
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA) and related claims. After the trial
court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification, Concepcion came down
and DirecTV moved to decertify the class and
compel arbitration. DirecTV’s arbitration
clause included a class action waiver and
provided generally that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, but also
provided: “If, however, the law of your state
would find this agreement to dispense with

class arbitration procedures unenforceable,
then this entire Section … is unenforceable.”
The trial court denied the motion based on
this language, and the Court of Appeal
affirmed, finding that “the law of California
would find the class action waiver
unenforceable because, for example, the
CLRA expressly precludes waiver of the
right to bring a class action under the CLRA.”
DirecTV argued that the decision was
contrary to Concepcion and its broad
interpretation of the FAA. However, the
Court stated, “[t]he FAA’s broad policy of
enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms applies even to
‘agreements to arbitrate under different rules
than those set forth in the [FAA] itself.’” Id.
(citation omitted). Accordingly, based on the
California rule of contract interpretation that
a specific provision controls over a general
one, “the reference to ‘the law of your state’
in [the arbitration agreement] operates as ‘a
specific exception to the arbitration
agreement’s general adoption of the FAA’”
found elsewhere in the agreement. In
addition, the Court held, Plaintiffs’
“interpretation of the contract finds further
support in ‘the common-law rule of contract
interpretation that a court should construe
ambiguous language against the interest of
the party that drafted it.’”
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DirecTV relied on the recent Ninth Circuit
case of Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d
1218 (9th Cir. 2013), which was decided after
briefing in the Imburgia appeal was
completed. There, the Ninth Circuit held that
the class action waiver in DirecTV’s
customer agreement was enforceable under
Concepcion, which preempts contrary state
law. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
“‘the parties’ various contract interpretation
arguments’—which included both the
argument that the specific reference to state
law controlled over the general reference to
the FAA and the argument that ambiguities
should be construed against the drafter —
‘are largely irrelevant to our analysis,’
because under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, and the related
doctrine of federal preemption, federal law is
the law of every state.”

customer agreement would naturally
interpret the phrase ‘the law of your state’ as
referring to (nonfederal) state law, and any
ambiguity should be construed against the
drafter. On the other hand, insofar as the court
reasoned that contract interpretation is
irrelevant because the parties are powerless
to opt out of the FAA by contract, we are
aware of no authority for the court’s
position.”
DirecTV’s counsel has stated that the
company intends to appeal. Thus, the extent
to which parties are indeed powerless to opt
out of the FAA because “federal law is the
law of every state,” or whether state law
contract principles may allow them to do so,
remains undecided. Based on the broad
scope of the FAA as interpreted by
Concepcion and Murphy, it is far from clear
that the Imburgia decision will survive.

The California Court of Appeal was
unpersuaded: “a reasonable reader of the
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